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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Research and Analysis Branch

Psychology Division Report No. 55

I.	General	1
1.	Background and Social Origins	1
a.	Birth - Death	1
b.	Education	1
c.	The Social Class	1
2.	Population	1
a.	General Characteristics	1
b.	Total Population	1
c.	Distribution of Population	1
d.	Religious Beliefs	1
e.	Sex and Age	1
f.	Physical and Mental Characteristics	1

SURVEY OF SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
INTELLIGENCE FOR FORMULATING PLANS FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN

September 19, 1942

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CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
FOREWARD	1
I. GENERAL SOCIAL BACKGROUND	3
A. Name	3
B. Racial and Social Origins	3
1. Basic Stock	3
2. Koreans	4
3. The Divine Race	4
C. Population	5
1. Present Distribution	5
a. Total Population	5
b. Concentration of Population	5
c. National Groups	7
d. Sex and Age	7
e. Urban-Rural Distribution	8
f. Japanese Abroad	9
2. The Growth of Japanese Population	11
D. Basic Economy and Living Standards	12
1. Economy	12
a. Agriculture	12
b. Livestock Raising	14
c. Fishing	14
d. Industry and Trade	15
e. Effects of the War on Japanese Industry	18
f. Labor Conditions	18
g. Monopoly and Government in Industry	20
h. Current Situation	22
2. Living Standards	22
a. General	22
b. Housing	23
c. Clothing	23
d. Diet	24
E. Social Classes and Groups	27
1. Traditional Classes	27
2. Contemporary Social Classes	27
a. The "People who Dwell Above the Clouds"	28

Table of Contents: OSS Supply Committee Planning Group - Working Papers

CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>Page</u>
G. <i>Religion</i>	
1. b. The Nobility	28
c. Multimillionaires and Business Magnates	28
d. The Middle Classes	29
e. Technicians	30
f. Farmers	30
g. The Urban Proletariat	31
h. The Eta	31
3. Special Groups	32
a. The Military	32
b. The Bureaucrats	33
4. Women	34
a. General Social Position	34
b. Geisha and Joro	35
c. Women's Organizations	36
F. Government and Social Control	36
1. Tokyo Group Rule	36
2. Formal Government Structure	37
a. The Emperor and His Advisers	37
b. Group Representation Among the Emperor's Counselors	38
c. The Diet	39
d. The Departments	39
e. Administrative Units	40
f. Village Government	40
g. Local vs. Central Authority	41
3. Forms of Social Control	42
a. Civil Control	42
b. Military Control	42
(1) Social Origins of Army Recruits	42
(2) Army Discipline and Democracy	42
(3) The Navy	43
c. Religious Control	43
d. People's Check on the Government	44
e. Government Leaders	44
f. Recent Trends	45
4. The Family in Social Control	45
a. Family Structure	46
b. Family Control	46
c. Family Religion	46
d. Effects of Urbanism on The Family	47

Table of Contents: OSS Supporting Committee Planning Group - Working Papers

CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>PAGE</u>
G. Religious Beliefs and Practices . . .	48
1. The Forms of Religion	48
a. Buddhism	49
b. Popular Shinto	50
c. Shinto Sects	50
d. State Shinto	51
e. Christianity	52
f. Islam	52
g. Confucianism	53
2. Religion as a Form of Social Control	53
3. Japanese Agnosticism	53
4. Seasons and Holidays	53
II. CHANNELS OF INDOCTRINATION OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE	56
A. Education	56
1. Informal Educational Influences	56
2. Government System	58
a. Elementary School	58
b. Young People's Schools	60
c. Middle School	60
d. Agricultural and Other Technical Schools	60
e. Preparatory Schools	60
f. Universities	61
g. Girls' Schools	62
3. Literacy	63
4. Aims in Education	66
5. Recent Trends in Education	66
B. Mass Communications	68
1. The Press	68
a. General Newspaper Situation	68
b. Government Control	69
c. Press Freedom	70
d. Influence of the Press	71
e. Foreign Language Press	71
f. Magazines	72
2. Radio	72
a. Equipment	73
b. Programs	74
3. Films	74
a. Japanese Domestic Production	74
b. Theaters and Audience	74
c. Characteristics of Japanese Films	75

July 11, 1944
Records: OSS
Supplies
Executive Planning Group - Working Papers

CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>Page</u>
d. Government Control	76
e. Export of Japanese films	77
f. The Role of Foreign Films in Japan	77
C. Special Propaganda Devices	80
1. Semi-Private Organizations	80
a. For Export Propaganda	80
b. For Domestic Propaganda	80
2. Imperial Rescripts	81
3. Holidays, Commemorative Songs, Slogans	81
D. General Nature of Domestic Propaganda	82
1. History of "thought control"	82
2. Organizational Complexity	83
3. Major Aims	84
4. Content Summary	84
a. Arguments to Convince the Japanese People That Japan Will Win	85
b. Arguments to Convince the Japanese People That the War is Necessary, Justified, and Desirable	87
c. Appeals to the glory of Japan and the Emperor, and to Japan's Manifest Destiny as a World Ruler	89
d. The Pattern of Behavior and the Attitudes Asked of the Japanese People	91
E. Japanese Export Propaganda	92
F. Present Propaganda Influences from Foreign Countries	94
1. Germany and Italy	94
2. United States and England	95
3. China	96
4. Russia	96
III. NATIONALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY ORIENTED SOCIAL ATTITUDES	97
A. Historic Basis of Modern Attitudes	97
1. The Tokugawa Period	97
a. Isolation	97
b. Government	98
c. Rise of Commercialism	99
2. The Meiji Restoration and After	100

14471-11-16-61 Records: OSS Supplying Committee Planning Group - Working Papers

CONFIDENTIAL

	Page
B. Japanese Nationalism	104
1. Glorification of Race and Culture	104
2. Phases of Nationalism	106
a. State Shinto	107
b. Bushido	110
c. Kodo	111
3. The Ideal and the Actual in Japanese Patriotism	111
a. The Top Cliques	112
b. Middle Classes	112
c. Workers	113
d. Farmers	114
e. Army Rank and File	115
f. Sincerity and Skepticism	116
C. Attitudes Toward Foreign Countries and Peoples	116
1. Native Peoples	116
2. Koreans	117
3. The Chinese and China	119
4. The U.S.S.R. and the Russians	121
5. Other Western Nations	121
a. United States	123
b. Great Britain	123
c. France	124
d. Germany	125
6. Conclusion	126
APPENDIX A: FESTIVAL AND HISTORIC DATES	131
APPENDIX B: JAPANESE NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES	135
APPENDIX C: JAPANESE RADIO STATIONS	135

APPENDIX C: JAPANESE RADIO STATIONS
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to achieve victory. To cooperate effectively against
this state of mind requires a comprehensive and
thorough understanding of the social structure,
forms of social control, the interplay of social and
psychological forces among the Japanese, and the
important cultural values of individual Japanese.

This paragraph attempts systematically to present essential information on these questions, incorporating these kinds of material:

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FOREWORD

The "Estimate" or "Appreciation" of a military situation, basic to the planning and executing of operations in a given theatre, requires a preliminary collection of critical military intelligence in the form of a Survey or Monograph. In exactly the same sense, the estimate and operations of psychological warfare require the organization of critical social and psychological intelligence about the given theatre.

This monograph attempts to present the kinds of intelligence about the Japanese which are believed to be essential to formulating integrated plans for psychological warfare operations against them.

Though psychological warfare is relatively futile unless conducted in coordination with military operations, which, in turn, it may facilitate, nevertheless, the specific objectives of psychological warfare are different from those of military operations. Therefore, the intelligence survey required is different in kind and emphasis from that included in strategic surveys or naval monographs. Experience and new information will, of course, improve this kind of survey.

The prime objective of psychological warfare against the Japanese is to destroy their will to achieve victory. To operate effectively against this state of mind requires a comprehensive and thorough understanding of the social structure, forms of social control, the interplay of social and psychological forces among the Japanese, and the important cultural values of individual Japanese.

This monograph attempts systematically to present essential information on these questions, incorporating three kinds of material:

1. Basic social information essential for the evaluation of the current situation in Japan. This material is designed to provide a concise description of relevant aspects of Japanese social organization and culture: the groups to be dealt with, their ways of life, their social controls and inter-relations, their sources of indoctrination and

CONFIDENTIAL

Report No. 75

SURVEY OF SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL

opinion. Most of this information is presented in sections I, II.A., and II.B.

2. Pertinent attitudes. Traditional and current attitudes of the important social groups: ideologies and beliefs, inter-group antagonisms and amities, nationally and internationally oriented attitudes. Some of these are described in conjunction with the basic social information, others in section III.

3. Analyses of the psychological warfare campaigns currently waged in Japan. This information is designed to reveal the "propaganda atmosphere" to which the people of Japan are exposed. Section II.B. describes the available means of communication -- radio, press, films -- with some emphasis on their past significance to the Japanese. Sections II.D. and F., respectively, analyze the Japanese domestic propaganda and the propaganda influences from other countries.

It is believed that this survey will be useful not only to a basic estimate of psychological warfare against Japan, but to general and combat propaganda services, special operations and intelligence services concerned with the execution of psychological warfare.

The Japanese are to and all further discussion when a non-Japanese is to say, "I am Japanese." The implication is that, being Japanese, his ways are different from and superior to a non-Japanese, so there is no further point in arguing. To be Japanese is to be right.

B. Racial and Social Origins

1. Basic Stock. Basically of Mongoloid stock, the Japanese people are of mixed racial origin. The Japanese archipelago, like the British Isles, lies off a large continental land mass and has drawn its population and cultures from the north, south, and center of this mainland since the dawn of history.

A lengthy discussion of this complex situation may be found in "A Study of the Varied Races for Japan" in Cultural Japan, 1940, 3, Nos. 1 and 2.

2
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1 of 2

SURVEY OF SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
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GENERAL SOCIAL BACKGROUND

A. Name Dominant among the ancestors of the modern Japanese are Manchu's people. The name Japan is a western modification of a Chinese reading of the characters (Jihpen). The traditional Japanese pronunciation of the characters is Nihon, though of recent years a variation of this, Nippon, has gained official approval as the "proper" name for Japan. In Japan, the characters may also be read Yamato, as in Yamato damashii, Japanese spirit. Dai Nippon or Great Japan is still another and popular name for the country. ¹/ A Japanese person is called Nihonjin. Since they believe themselves and their country to be sacred creations of the gods, Japanese have very strong effective associations with the name of their country. As a symbol of unity, Nihonjin (Japanese person) is perhaps even stronger than Dai Nippon (Great Japan). The final argument of a Japanese to end all further discussion with a non-Japanese is to say, "I am Japanese." The implication is that, being Japanese, his ways are different from and superior to a non-Japanese, so there is no further point in arguing. To be Japanese is to be right.

B. Racial and Social Origins

B. Racial and Social Origins Despite their rather mixed racial derivation, all Japanese within Japan today are regarded as of one race. 1. Basic Stock. Basically of Mongoloid stock, the Japanese people are of mixed racial origin. The Japanese archipelago, like the British Isles, lies off a large continental land mass and has drawn its population and cultures from the north, south, and center of this mainland since the dawn of history.

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The aboriginal peoples, such as the Ainu and the Kumaso, who are characterized by hairy chests and faces, probably came into Japan from an early Caucasoid stock of northeast Asia. Remnants of the Ainu type can be found today in many isolated areas, from Hokkaido in the North to the Luchus in the South, but Ainu culture survives only in Hokkaido. The Ainu strain shows itself in the modern Japanese by the greater amount of facial and body hair he possesses as compared with the average Chinese.

Dominant among the ancestors of the modern Japanese are Mongoloid peoples, who came in via Korea from time to time. These peoples displaced and interbred with the Ainu. Their early cultural development was significantly influenced by the relative isolation of Japan and by Chinese influences, which also penetrated via Korea.

A Malayan strain came in from the South, which accounts for the frequent occurrence of wavy hair among modern Japanese. There are a number of elements in Japanese culture that also probably came up from the South, such as the Japanese type of dwelling. The devotion of the old Samurai to head-chopping may be related to Malayan head-hunting customs found in Formosa and the Philippines.

Karafuto (ceded by Russia in

2. Koreans. Aside from the few surviving Ainu, the Koreans make up the only important ethnic minority in Japan today. Many have come to Japan as unskilled laborers, some are itinerant peddlers of one sort or another and a few are skilled artisans.

3. The Divine Race. Despite their rather mixed racial derivation, all Japanese within Japan today are regarded as of common origin, descended from a series of Japanese deities. As such all Japanese are felt to be superior to all other peoples; Koreans, Chinese, Europeans, and Americans are lesser breeds. The one Japanese group within the country which is subject to persecution, the Eta, is popularly believed to be not Japanese at all, but made up of the descendants of Korean prisoners (see Section E.2.h. below on the Eta). Even Japanese born overseas, in Hawaii or California for example, are not regarded as true Japanese. Basic data for official sources unless otherwise indicated. Analysis and minor computations made in the Psychology Division.

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Japanese, since they were not born on the sacred soil of Japan. Japan thus has an indigenous myth of racial homogeneity and superiority which antedates the German Aryan myth by many centuries.

C. Population

1. Present Distribution


a. Total Population. According to the Japanese census of 1940 the total population of the Japanese Empire is 105,226,101. This population is distributed as follows:

Japan Proper	73,114,308
Chosen or Korea (annexed 1910)	24,326,327
Taiwan or Formosa (ceded by China in 1895 as a result of Sino-Japanese War)	5,872,084
Kwantung (leased from China in 1915 for 99 years, now under jurisdiction of Manchukuo)	1,367,334
Karafuto (ceded by Russia in 1905 as a result of Russo-Japanese War)	414,891
Mandated Islands (acquired 1919)	131,157


b. Concentration of Population. In Japan Proper the population is very heavily concentrated, there being 495 persons per square mile for a total area slightly smaller than the State of California. The latter has a density of only 44 people per square mile. The people cluster thickly in the valleys and coastal areas, the most densely settled region being along an east-west zone from Fukuoka in Kyushu to the Kwansai plain area in east central Honshu. Hokkaido is rather sparsely settled, as are the large mountainous sections of the other islands. (See attached map, Population Densities in Japan)

POPULATION DENSITIES IN JAPAN

DENSITIES BY PREFECTURES AND PROVINCES
Persons Per Square Kilometer



Census of 1940



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c. National Groups. Over 99 per cent of the inhabitants of Japan Proper are Japanese. In addition, there are nearly half a million Koreans, twenty to twenty-five thousand Chinese (one-third of whom are from Formosa and Manchukuo), and perhaps ten thousand other foreigners. As officially estimated for 1938, these "other foreigners" included roughly 2,000 each of Americans, English, and Germans, and about 1,300 non-Soviet Russians, with a scattering of other European and Asiatic nationals. Since 1938 the Germans have increased in number, but most of the other Caucasian groups have decreased sharply.

d. Sex and Age. The population is almost evenly divided as to sex, there being 36,566,010 males and 36,548,298 females in 1940.

In age the Japanese population averages roughly seven years younger than the American (median ages are approximately 22 and 29 years).^{1/} While this age differential might suggest that the Japanese, being younger, are better able to wage war than Americans, examination of the age distributions of the two countries shows that the lower average age of the Japanese is to be attributed to the disproportionately large number of children under 15 years.

AGE DISTRIBUTIONS: JAPAN AND THE
UNITED STATES (1935) ^{2/}

Age in Years	% of Total Population in Each Age Group	
	Japan Proper	United States
Under 15	37%	27%
15 - 44	43%	43%
45 and over	20%	25%
Total	100%	100%

^{1/} Actually, the difference is probably greater, since the Japanese method of reckoning age is to call a child one year old at birth, and to count him as two on and after the next New Year's Day. Thus, Japanese ages as reported in official sources are presumably from one to two years higher than would be shown by our method of age reckoning.

^{2/} Japanese figures based on a 1935 Census as reported in the 1941 Far East Yearbook. No later age

8

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Actually, a larger proportion of the American than of the Japanese population falls in the most productive age group, 15-44 years. There are also relatively more people over 45 years of age in the United States than in Japan.

In terms of manpower potential this means that the United States and Japan have very nearly identical proportions of their population at the most vital military and industrial ages, and that while the United States has to provide for the needs of a larger proportion of unproductive oldsters, the Japanese have to provide for relatively more unproductive children.

These age differences probably cannot be attributed to race, to decadence, or to anything other than differences in the social development of the two nations. The present age composition of the American population is the net result of changes associated with the industrial revolution -- a rising living standard, improved medical care, and the like. These changes are occurring in Japan, but have not yet sufficiently improved health conditions to give the average Japanese as long a life as the average American.

e. Urban-Rural Distribution. The published figures regarding the urban and rural populations of Japan and the United States cannot be directly compared because of differences in definitions, but the proportions of the total populations of the two countries in towns and cities of various sizes provide a good measure of urbanization. The basic data for 1940 are these:

	<u>Japan</u>	<u>U.S.</u>
Per cent in towns of 10,000 and over	49.9	47.6
Per cent in cities of 50,000 and over	34.4	34.4
Per cent in cities of 100,000 and over	29.1	28.8

It is immediately evident that the degree of urban concentration in Japan and in the United States today is virtually the same.

9

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Japan's urbanization is much more recent than America's, however. In the United States the proportion of population in cities of 50,000 or over changed very little between 1930 and 1940 (34.9% to 34.4%), whereas in Japan the proportion of population in such cities increased ten percentage points (24.6% to 34.4%) during the same period. Moreover, this relative gain was concentrated in the larger cities. The proportion of people living in cities of 100,000 and over increased from 17.8% in 1930 to 29.1% in 1940. Among the ten largest Japanese cities, only Kyoto failed to grow more rapidly than the total population, as the following table shows. (See also attached map, Cities of Japan.) This rapid growth of the larger cities from 1930-1940 is a concomitant of Japan's rapid industrial expansion.

TEN LARGEST JAPANESE CITIES¹
1935 and 1940

<u>City</u>	<u>Population</u>		<u>Per cent Increase</u>
	1935	1940	
(Total Population of Japan Proper)	69,254,148	73,114,308	5.6
Tokyo	5,895,882	6,778,804	15.0
Osaka	2,989,874	3,252,340	8.8
Nagoya	1,110,314	1,328,084	19.6
Kyoto	1,080,593	1,089,726	0.8
Yokohama	796,581	968,091	21.5
Kobe	912,179	967,234	15.8
Hiroshima	310,118	343,968	10.9
Fukuoka	305,793	323,217	5.7
Kawasaki	191,700	300,777	56.9
Kure	259,584	276,085	6.4

f. Japanese Abroad. The number of Japanese resident in the outlying parts of the Empire is probably not more than 1.7 million.²

CITIES OF JAPAN

Data for the Cities of Japan from the Census of October 1, 1940

Area of Circle is Proportional to Population of City

- 100,000
- 500,000
- 1,000,000
- 7,000,000

Scale: 0 100 200 300 400 500 MILES

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Data for the Cities of Japan from the Census of October 1, 1940

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Scale: 0 to 500 MILES


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- 7,000,000

Scale: 0 to 500 MILES

17

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An additional 1,059,913 overseas Japanese were officially reported as resident outside the Empire on October 1, 1938.^{1/} These Japanese abroad were distributed as follows:

Asia	558,745 (4-5 hundred thousand in Manchuria, many in China, and several thousand in Southeast Asia)
South America	200,820 (Over 98 per cent in Brazil)
Oceania	154,933 (Mostly in Hawaii, 24,000 in the Philippines, and 6,000 in the Netherlands East Indies)
North America	142,395 (Mostly in California and British Columbia)
Europe	2,807
Africa	213

These figures are of especial interest because they make evident the reluctance of Japanese to emigrate even to those parts of the Empire which have been longest under Japanese control. Only about 3½ per cent of all Japanese live abroad, even after a decade of excellent opportunities for colonial settlement (in Manchuria). Since the population of Japan Proper has recently been increasing at the rate of about 1 per cent per year, the total number living elsewhere is roughly equal to the increment for only 3½ years. To put the matter in other terms, the number emigrating annually was only 1-2 per cent of the average annual population increase from 1926-1937. Since the standard of living definitely rose in these same years, it seems apparent that the attempt to justify Japanese Imperialist expansion in terms of "population pressure on natural resources" is unwarranted.

2. The Growth of Japanese Population^{2/} Because of the increased productivity made possible by industrialization and the partial modernization of

^{1/} Not including those in the armed forces, who are counted in their home districts. The official figures are quoted from the Far East Yearbook, 1941.

^{2/} Vital statistics quoted from the Far East Yearbook, 1941.

102

12

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agricultural techniques, Japan was able to double her population between 1872 and 1940, and at the same time to raise living standards considerably. Modern medicine reduced the death rate, and the birth rate remained high, thus producing a high rate of natural increase.

Since 1932, a year in which the excess of births over deaths was at a maximum of over a million, the death rate has been stabilized, at least temporarily, at about 17 per thousand,^{1/} while the birth rate shows signs of gradual decline from its recent level of 30 or 31 per thousand.^{2/} Thus, population growth in Japan has proceeded more slowly during the last ten years than during the preceding decade; and in all probability, especially because military mobilization on a big scale is likely to reduce the birth rate, this slowing of the rate of growth will continue.

D. Basic Economy and Living Standards

Japanese civilian attitudes and actions bearing on their war effort are determined in part by economic ways of life as they work out in wages, labor conditions, ownership, housing, diet, health, etc. Any significant deprivations in these conditions as engineered or played upon by psychological warfare operations may significantly affect the individual's will to fight. Intelligence for psychological warfare against Japan requires, therefore, a brief treatment of those economic features of the Japanese which may reveal their conception of current and future personal, family and national well-being.

1. Economy. The two outstanding features of Japan's economy are (1) its self-sufficient agricultural and fishing foundation and (2) the remarkable strength of its new industrial structure, despite dependence on areas overseas for raw materials and markets.

a. Agriculture. The cultivated area of Japan Proper is about fifteen million acres or nearly 16 per cent of the total area. About 80 per cent

^{1/} In the United States, the death rate is 10 or 11 per 1,000.

^{2/} In the United States, the birth rate is 16 or 17 per 1,000.

102

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of the crop land is devoted to cereals, especially rice and wheat, and the rest to soy beans, potatoes, mulberry (for silk production), vegetables, tea, and fruits.

There are very few Japanese farms of any size. In 1934 it was estimated that only 4,000 persons had estates larger than 124 acres, with the average size of these estates only 300 acres. Over one-third of all Japanese farms are less than 1.23 acres, while the average "farm" consists of only 2.61 acres, usually made up of several small strips scattered around the agricultural village.

One-third of the farmers own their own land; one-fourth are tenant farmers; the remainder own a part of the land they till and rent the rest. Prior to the outbreak of the China war, the net profit of the average farmer with a family of five was estimated at 200 yen (nominally \$60) a year, and because this was insufficient to support such a family, even in rural Japan, the farmers steadily increased their indebtedness. Since then, however, farm produce prices have risen, and the movement of workers to the army and to war industries has left fewer mouths to feed. As a consequence, the living standard of the average farm family has probably risen, along with that of skilled industrial workers, while that of white collar workers has gone down.

Rice, the most important crop, accounts for 40 per cent of the total crop area and constitutes the staple food throughout Japan. In addition to its use as a food, rice is made into sake and shochu, two widely-used alcoholic drinks, and in rural areas it is still used to some extent as a medium of exchange. The Japanese consider foreign rice inferior to their own, prefer their own highly polished, and object to eating rice mixed with other cereals. Up to 1939 Japan, Korea, and Formosa supplied 99 per cent of the rice consumed in the country. When a shortage occurred in 1939-1940, Japan imported rice from other areas, especially Indo-China, Burma, and Thailand, and also instituted rationing and certain other restrictions on consumption. Only the cutting off of the more distant sources, plus crop failures at home and the interruption of transport from Korea and Formosa, could cause a disastrous reduction in Japan's supplies of this staple.

2-18

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Meanwhile, domestic wheat production has been increased even beyond the 66 million bushels grown in 1940 (which was double the crop of 1932).

Next to rice, soybeans are the most important item in the daily diet of the Japanese, supplying most of the protein and being used in seasoning sauce as well as in soup and bean curd (tofu). Manchuria is the main source of supply, but production there has been decreasing, owing to the farmers' objections to low prices; and Japanese imports were reduced from 58 million bushels in 1938-1939 to 48 million in 1940-1941, and may be less than 40 million this year.

Only a few major changes in Japanese agriculture seem to be attributable to the war. Wheat production has increased at the expense of mulberry; the soybean supply has become seriously, but as yet not critically, limited; and there is a shortage of rural labor (something new for Japan) as a result of conscription and the expansion of the industrial labor force. It is probable that the tradition of cooperative labor, increased mechanization, reduction of non-food agriculture (mulberry), and increased growing of wheat and other grains requiring less hand labor than rice will meet the problem of the rural labor shortage.

b. Livestock Raising. There are comparatively few horses or cattle in Japan; and pigs, sheep, and poultry are not extensively raised. This is largely because Japanese agricultural techniques ordinarily make no provision for open pasture land, and meat and milk products are unimportant in the Japanese diet. The per capita consumption of meat (excluding poultry) is about four pounds per year as compared with 125 pounds consumed in the United States. Dairy products are traditionally considered unclean by Japanese, and the per capita consumption amounts to only one pound per year, but enough chickens are raised to provide an egg per week per person.

c. Fishing. Fishing villages dot the coast line of Japan Proper. The industry employs normally at least one and a half million persons and requires over a third of a million boats, one-fifth of them equipped with engines, including a fleet of floating canneries and mother ships. The latter can

192

2- 15

CONFIDENTIAL

operate far from home, but a very large proportion of Japan's own consumption of fish and aquatic products is provided for by small boats operating close to home.

The catch is enormous, surpassing that of any other country in the world, and for Japan proper it amounts to over 25 per cent of the world's total. The Japanese consume more fish than any other people (about 100 pounds a year per capita), fish taking the place of meat and dairy products in the native diet.

In addition to its strictly economic importance, Japan's fishing industry has played a significant role in recent Japanese history. Fishing rights in northern Pacific waters are a perennial source of friction between Japan and the Soviet Union. Fishermen -- or naval officers disguised as fishermen -- have been "at the disposal of the Japanese Navy to collect maritime data and generally to do intelligence work,"^{1/} in the East Indies and apparently also in Russian and Alaskan waters. Currently, the conclusion of the North Pacific fishing season in August to September is thought by some to be an important factor in the Japanese decision with regard to an attack on Siberia.

d. Industry and Trade. One of the remarkable aspects of Japan's recent trade and industrial expansion is the fact that it has been achieved without the sacrifice of virtual self-sufficiency at home. Only the sudden interruption of all or practically all overseas supplies would cause serious difficulties in supplying domestic needs. In part, this is attributable to the flexibility of the Japanese industrial organization.

Less than 20 per cent of the gainful workers in Japan are engaged in manufacturing, and in 1930 over half the industrial labor force were in shops employing fewer than five persons, while about 70 per cent were in factories with less than fifty employees.

^{1/} Netherlands Information Bureau, Ten Years of Japanese Burrowing in the Netherlands East Indies, p. 37, New York, no date.

142

46
CONFIDENTIAL

The major part of the manufacturing industry of Japan is still carried on in small factories and home workshops. Large-scale industrial plants are found almost solely in such industries as iron and steel, textiles, chemicals, shipbuilding, and munitions; and even in these fields a large plant is usually surrounded by a number of small satellite plants and specialized home workshops (such as those winding armatures). These small-scale business units, numerous and well integrated as they are in Japan, provide an extraordinary capacity for low-cost production.

As a consequence of this Japanese system of industrial organization, much of her industrial capacity is decentralized; hydro-electric and other power facilities, for example, are remarkably well distributed throughout the islands of Japan Proper.

During the twenties and thirties, Japanese consumers' goods captured increasing shares of the world market, her cotton textiles even competing successfully with English goods in the Indian market. This tremendous expansion in the volume of Japanese exports was accompanied by a corresponding increase in the volume of imported raw materials, for Japan Proper has few natural resources and her manufacturing depends largely on the processing of imported materials.

Japan's success in competition with the older industrial powers has been largely due to the maintenance of the low living standards which were appropriate to the feudal agricultural economy of Tokugawa days. Japan's industrialization has not destroyed old habits of frugality, nor has it so greatly changed patterns of home consumption as we are likely to assume. As a result, the domestic market has been unable to buy the goods produced in Japanese factories, and it has been possible for Japanese industrialists to export these goods at a great competitive advantage as compared with countries whose workers enjoy a higher standard of living. As the editors of Fortune put it in 1936, "the industrial workers of Japan live on one economic level while their goods sell on another."^{1/}

^{1/} Fortune, September 1936, p. 116

1 of 2

17
CONFIDENTIAL

This thrust of the Japanese into world markets is a part of the causal nexus behind the present war. Obviously, the economic exploitation of markets is easier if those markets are controlled politically as well, and this fact has been of great importance in making Japanese industrialists willing to support the expansionist policies of the military. Especially have the Japanese feared that unless they secured hegemony over East Asia, some other combination of powers -- among them a modernized China -- would succeed in winning markets away from them by political and economic measures. It is certainly too simple to say that Japan has gone to war merely to secure continuing control of Asiatic markets, but this aim is nevertheless an important part of the picture for many Japanese.

Even before Japanese armed forces overran Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, Netherlands Indies, Borneo, etc., Japan was a major, in some cases the only, industrial supplier for extensive and primarily agricultural areas overseas. In return for manufactures, Formosa sent sugar; Korea, cotton, wool, coal, and rice; the Mandated Islands (called the Nanyo or South Sea Islands), bauxite and phosphates; Manchuria, iron, coal, and soybeans; Occupied China, coal and cotton; Indo-China and Thailand, rubber, tin, and rice.

An important development in Japanese industry is a concentration on new things, such as light metals and chemicals. Japanese steel production (8 million tons annually) has moved close to that of Great Britain and has surpassed that of France, although it is but one-tenth that of the United States. But Japan is not slavishly imitating the nations which earlier became the industrial giants of the Coal and Iron Age, for there is good reason to believe, even though war secrecy has been maintained since 1937, that she is concentrating on the new technics of the Chemicals and Light Metals Age. Evidence of this may be seen in the intensive development of electric power facilities. Even in 1937 production of electric energy in Japan Proper, to say nothing of recent developments in Manchuria, had reached 26.5 billion kilowatt hours, or nearly one-fourth of the year's production, for the much greater area and richer private market of the United States.

Foreign Magazine for July 1938, Vol. 12, No. 127

142

18
CONFIDENTIAL

In almost all items of economic potential the United States is to be compared with Japan Proper in such terms as ten, four, twenty, or twice as much. But in the present pitting of war economies, it would fit in with characteristic Japanese thinking to attempt something like ju jitsu to defeat nations stronger along the traditional lines of steel, coal, and machine tools. This Japan might do by taking full advantage of her new war position, with its interior lines of supply, and of new techniques borrowed from Germany, such as powder metallurgy (as opposed to casting, drop-forging, and costly machining).^{1/} Indeed, the analogy to ju jitsu -- skillfully using a light metals economy to make a heavy metals economy help defeat itself -- would have great appeal to the Japanese.

e. Effects of the War on Japanese Industry.

Many months before December 7, Japan's economy had begun a major reorganization to adjust to the cutting off of the United States and Europe as markets and sources of supply. In pre-war years, as much as three-fifths of Japan's imports were raw materials, and a similar share of her exports were finished goods. In addition, in gross tonnage of merchant shipping Japan had become the third nation in the world, surpassed only by Britain and the United States, and her earnings from shipping operations amounted to about a third of her annual invisible trade receipts. At present, Japan's total gross tonnage is over 6 million, including a significant number of fast, modern motor ships and tankers, and her new construction capacity is estimated to be between 300,000 and 700,000 tons per year. This, plus the fact that the normal use of many ships to carry goods for other countries has practically ceased, means that Japan has surplus tonnage sufficient to sustain a considerable rate of losses in the next year or so.

f. Labor Conditions. In all the Far East Japan has the only large body of labor skilled in the production, use, and maintenance of modern machinery. In December 1939 it is estimated that there were 6.4 million skilled workers in Japan

^{1/} For a discussion of powder metallurgy, see Leonard Engel, "The Sources of Germany's Might" in Harper's Magazine for July 1942, No. 1106, pp. 199-207.

102

19

CONFIDENTIAL

distributed as follows (in thousands):

Manufacturing	4,650
Mining	533
Transport and	
Communications	500
Building and Construction	373
Marine Industry	252
Gas, Electricity and	
Water Works	73

In 1938, of the 3.2 million workers in manufacturing plants employing five or more workers, 1.2 million were women, most of them in spinning and textile mills. In contrast to the United States, where less than one-fourth of adult women (over 15 years) were gainfully employed in 1930, nearly half of the Japanese women worked. Since then there has been a considerable increase of women replacing men as factory workers in a variety of lines, but on the other hand, the freezing of Japanese credits has diminished imports of cotton and exports of silk so that the number of textile workers has decreased.

Although wages in terms of dollar exchange are low, so are commodity prices, and the traditional standard of living calls for different and often cheaper means of subsistence. Japan usually pays higher wages than any other country within her sphere of control, and in areas under her domination Japanese workers get higher wages than the natives. Prevailing wages in 1940 in typical industries ranged from \$.43 to \$.74 per day for men, and \$.21 to \$.38 per day for women. These wages must, of course, be measured against such living cost facts as a day's food for a family of five need cost only eleven cents per person. At present wages are fixed by law, and the legal freedom of the worker to accept or refuse a job has been drastically curtailed. The National Mobilization Act of 1938 required all Japanese workers to register and state their skills, and the authorities have exercised their new powers to assign workers to specific tasks.

Working hours were formerly limited to twelve per day, and in most occupations employees worked nine or ten; but now, under wartime regulations, many may be required to work twelve hours a day or more. Not only do a large proportion of

1 of 2

22
20
CONFIDENTIAL

Japanese women work (either at farm tasks or in industry), but children under 15 years comprised about a tenth of the entire working population in 1938, and at present must make up an even larger proportion.

G. Monopoly and Government in Industry.

Practically the entire industrial plant of Japan is concentrated in the hands of a few great holding companies controlled by five families. The three largest of these houses -- Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo -- directly control one-quarter of all Japanese trade and industry. The following table suggests how this control is distributed among a few industries:^{1/}

<u>Industry</u>	<u>Proportion of Total Controlled</u>
Mitsui (largest and most powerful):	
Cotton	14%
Rayon	15%
Paper	78%
Mining	17%
Cement	17%
Coal and Shipping	11%

Mitsubishi (ranking second)

Banking	5%
Trust Companies	10%
Marine and Fire Insurance	39%

Each house also controls or influences hundreds of other important companies, so that all five together control two-thirds or more of the industry and trade of Japan and indirectly affect practically all the rest. They even reach down to the small workshops by supplying brokers with capital to act as contracting agents for the large-scale concerns who farm out part of their work.

The government in the past has established many enterprises, but these have frequently passed into the hands of the great financial houses. The state relies upon these family concerns for backing, and they are key figures in the organization of production for the present war program.

^{1/} See "Men, Yen, and Machines" in Fortune for September 1936.

102

2-21

CONFIDENTIAL

The government, however, still retains ownership of such organizations as railways, tobacco and camphor monopolies, certain defense industries, and colonial and overseas expansion enterprises. The greatest iron and steel company, the shipyards, aircraft factories, and munition plants are partly under government supervision. Through the Postal Deposits Bureau the government controls a large part of the savings of the poorer classes.

The explanation for the concentration of financial power in the hands of a few families is to be found in the rapid industrialization of feudal Japan after 1868. The Mitsui and Sumitomo families were merchants and had the capital to back the restored Imperial Government. Later, governmental support enabled them to mushroom into their present position. Mitsubishi, Yasuda, Okura, and several smaller houses are more recent in their development, but almost without exception the pattern of their rise has followed that of allying themselves with the government or otherwise "using the Emperor." As indicated below (Section I.E., Social Classes and Groups), many elements in the population, especially in the army, resent this economic control of the financial clique (Zaibatsu).

The family system of Japan is also reflected in paternalistic arrangements in industry. The master-apprentice relation of feudal days has been extended to the modern factory, so that definite and by now traditional duties and obligations are imposed upon both management and worker. As in the old days, when the master brought the apprentice into his house as one of the family, the management of a large factory is expected to provide dormitories for workers, supervise their welfare, pay prescribed bonuses, and when a worker leaves, pay an allowance based upon length of service. Inasmuch as the discipline of Japanese family life has prepared workers to expect these arrangements, they cannot be interpreted simply as devices of capitalistic ownership to enslave the workers, even to the extent of attaching them physically to the factory by means of dormitory life.

Another traditional Japanese social pattern which is becoming very prominent in the present war economy is that of cooperation in associations. Thus, such organizations as the Imperial Rule Assistance

101

22
CONFIDENTIAL

Association, the Iron Ore Control Association, the National Finance Control Society, the Metals Control Society involve the same principles of group action and mutual responsibility as have characterized village government since Tokugawa days. (See below Section I.F.2.f. Village Government) These quasi-public associations and societies include the notion of voluntary collaboration of all concerned, as well as that of centralized control, and in this sense contrast sharply -- and surprisingly -- with our "authorities", "administrations", and "commissions." It is perhaps not too much to say that these associations and societies constitute some of the forms of the distinctive Japanese approach to the "Corporate State."

h. Current Situation. Japan's major economic problem now is that of hanging on to her conquests, organizing their exploitation, and protecting the routes, especially by sea, that form her inside lines of communication. Until the latter are cut, or Japan's surplus ship tonnage is reduced to a lasting deficit, her war economy, drawing as it does from some of the richest regions in the world, will remain powerful. Moreover, Japan could easily sustain the sudden loss of her newest conquests, because her people are not dependent upon them for food, nor are all her industries yet dependent upon them for raw materials and markets. Following such losses (in the South Seas and in Southeast Asia), the Japanese could still resist strongly and retreat into their islands so slowly that there would probably be ample time to readjust the economy so as to guarantee the domestic food supply.

2. Living Standards.

a. General. While Japanese living standards are commonly referred to as low, it is probably less misleading to consider them as rather different from those of the West. Judged in terms of American values, the goods consumed by the average Japanese seem beggarly in contrast to our own average consumption. But if the terms of the comparison are reversed, American consumption seems profligate and wasteful according to Japanese values, while Japanese consumption, though frugal, is adequate to meet the needs of the people. It must be recognized that for the Japanese, the Japanese judgment rather than the American is the pertinent one.

192

CONFIDENTIAL

23

b. Housing. Most Japanese live in lightly constructed wood houses with sliding sidewall panels of wood and paper or glass, heated by small charcoal burners and supplied with a minimum of furniture. Beds, for example, consist of quilts spread on the mat-covered floor at night and in the daytime folded and put away in a closet.

Japanese dwellings are subject to damage by earthquake, fire, and incendiary bombs, but they are also very easily rebuilt. In Tokyo and other large cities, government buildings and sometimes office buildings are of reinforced concrete. Such buildings are constructed to be earthquake and fire-proof.

Homes must be thoroughly cleaned twice a year. At these times a policeman and a health inspector make the rounds to see that the housecleaning law is enforced. This is interesting evidence that, despite Japanese stress on personal cleanliness and daily bathing, the need for sanitation (a Western idea) is not fully appreciated.

c. Clothing. There is a common mistaken idea about Japanese dress to the effect that it is nearly the same for all classes and is uniformly cheap. Actually, dress varies widely. In the large cities, clerks and businessmen may wear Western style clothing during working hours, and laborers may work in sandals, jackets and pants, but away from work all groups favor the Japanese loose-fitting kimonos.

Western style clothing is inexpensive in Japan in terms of dollar exchange; it is reported that a good quality man's hat normally costs but \$.75; a whole outfit only \$5.00, and an overcoat (our \$30 or \$40 quality) less than \$10. Japanese dress, on the other hand, varies greatly in quality and cost. For a middle-class woman the required under kimono costs from ¥30 up; an outer kimono also costs from ¥30 up; an important article of dress, the obi or sash, may be obtained for ¥20, but may likewise run into thousands of yen; and finally, among the less conspicuous details, the jewelry of the obi-dome, the ornamental front buckle or clasp, may cost thousands of yen. A moderately priced middle class outfit might thus cost 100 yen (which

11-11-41 Final: OSS Japan - 1000 pps

142

24

CONFIDENTIAL

in purchasing power within Japan is equal to \$100 or more in the United States), so that a worker who gets one or two yen per day would have to save for some time to afford even a cheap one.

d. Diet. Japanese diet, in rural areas and even in cities, is much more varied and well-balanced than is commonly supposed. The ordinary meal usually includes bean soup (protein) and rice (carbohydrate). With the rice is frequently mixed some sea weed or vegetable product rich in both mineral and vitamin content. Fish, as has already been indicated, is also a common food. Among poor people and inland farmers fresh fish is served only at banquets, but various forms of dried fish are part of the common diet everywhere.

The chief difference in content between the American and Japanese diets is the virtual absence of meat from the latter. Since they regard cows' milk as unclean, the Japanese use it only for babies or by doctor's prescription.

There is no basis for the belief that the Japanese diet is basically inferior to that of the United States. As a matter of fact, the poor Japanese farmer probably eats a meal with more vitamins than does an American sharecropper. Some of the recent war measures, such as those cutting down the supply of polished in favor of unpolished rice and requiring a mixing of rice with barley or wheat, are likely to increase rather than decrease the nutritional value of the general diet in Japan.

A study made in 1927 for the League of Nations^{1/} showed that the amount of staple food (grains) available per capita annually in Japan was 217 kilograms (as against 266 in Great Britain, 285 in Germany, and 372 in the United States). That this comparison is not unfavorable to Japan is clear when one remembers that less grain is needed for the proportionately fewer horses and cattle in Japan, and also that an average Japanese weighs 110 pounds, while an average American weighs 150. In addition to cereals, the Japanese annually consumed other foods (vegetables, fish, etc.) at the rate of 486 kilograms per capita.

^{1/} Quoted in Hugh Byas, "The Japanese Enemy", p. 76

1 of 2

25
CONFIDENTIAL

It may be concluded that the daily diet of the Japanese has not yet been seriously changed by wartime restrictions. It is even possible that the Official Japanese Radio has played up rationing or has at least presented it in such a way as to mislead us. For example, on January 7 the United Press monitoring service reported the following Japanese broadcast under a headline, "JAPS TO DRAW BELTS TIGHTER":

"...The ration plan provided that each person in six of Japan's most thickly populated provinces would be limited to 35 handful of rice a month...."

This is indeed a reduction, but not so much of a cut as the style of presentation ("handful") would make it seem to Western ears. A "handful" is a common translation for the go, of which there are about 100 in our bushel, so the ration works out to about one-third of a bushel per month, or slightly over four bushels per year, just about twenty per cent less than the estimated normal per capita consumption (5 to 5½ bushels). Furthermore, the Japanese food situation has undoubtedly eased since last January.

Finally, it is to be expected that the Japanese virtue of frugality, especially as stressed in wartime, will contribute materially to the maintenance of a healthful diet despite possible minor reductions in food supplies.

e. Health and Concepts of Disease. The national health service in Japan is elaborate and efficient. There is universal vaccination against small pox, and school children receive regular health instruction and examination. However, as in most countries, advances in the fields of hygiene, preventive medicine, and sanitation have chiefly taken effect in the larger cities and towns. In rural areas infant mortality is high, due in part to a lack of doctors and in part to the faith women put in healing priests. Most farmers' wives feel they cannot afford a doctor's services, though almost all call on a professional midwife at the time of child delivery. A high rate of intestinal diseases is due in part to the use of human excrement as a crop fertilizer.

102

26

11/11/11 - 1st Period: DS3 Supp. Case - Humberg - 10000 PPS

25

CONFIDENTIAL

27

E. Social Classes and Groups

1. Traditional Classes. The traditional classes of feudal Japan were the Emperor and his relatives, the daimyo (feudal lords), the samurai (armed retainers of the lords), the farmers, the merchants, and the untouchables. In feudal days^{1/} the social distinctions were backed up by law, but after the "restoration" of the Emperor Meiji in 1868 this old class system was, legally speaking, abolished. Even before the legal change there had been one very important actual change -- the merchants and financiers had gradually risen above the farmers and acquired in many cases a financial superiority to both the samurai and the daimyo. Moreover, social attitudes did not change overnight with the legal change. The very lowly groups are socially if not legally persecuted to this day; well-to-do landed farmers still consider themselves superior to village brokers or shopkeepers; descendants of old samurai families, though belonging to various modern classes, often retain a definite pride in their origin.

2. Contemporary Social Classes. Today the Japanese official policy is to recognize no social distinctions between one group of Japanese and another. To admit class distinctions would be to admit a divided society. Despite this emphasis on racial and cultural homogeneity, there are numerous distinctions in social status, some ethnic, some economic, and some based on inherited rank.

The following social classes may be distinguished in present day Japan: the people who dwell above the clouds (the Imperial family); the nobility, multimillionaires and business magnates; the middle classes; technicians; farmers; the urban proletariat; and the Eta.

^{1/} See Section III.A.1., below, The Tokugawa Period, for a brief description of pre-restoration society.

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192

CONFIDENTIAL

28

a. The "People Who Dwell Above the Clouds."
-- that is, the Emperor and Empress, princes and princesses of the blood. No member of this class, which is hereditary, is supposed to tarnish his divinity by dealing in worldly matters of business or politics.

b. The Nobility. This class, also hereditary, consists of the ordinary princes, such as Prince Tokugawa, whose family once were the de facto rulers of Japan, Prince Konoyo, and the late elder statesman, Prince Saionji. Also included in the nobility are marquises, viscounts, and a few barons, most of them direct descendants of the old feudal lords. The more influential members of this hereditary nobility are sometimes referred to collectively as the Mombatsu.

The group as a whole exercises considerable influence on Japanese government. Some of the Emperor's influential advisers -- e.g., the present Minister of the Imperial Household, Matsudaira -- are of this group, and the House of Peers has as a whole almost equal power with the House of Representatives in the Japanese Diet. Members of this class also derive power simply from the prestige of their position.

c. Multimillionaires and Business Magnates. This class is not hereditary. It includes the industrial, financial, and other big-business leaders. There is a collective, somewhat critical, term for this group: the Zaibatsu, or financial clique. The Zaibatsu include many of the richest people in Japan -- Mitsui, Iwasaki, Sumitomo, Okura, and Yasuda. They comprise less than one-half per cent of the population, but control over 80 per cent of trade and industry, or did before the war began. Until 1941, certain influential groups in the army were often in cahoots with the Zaibatsu, but it is possible that, with the young officers' anti-capitalist bias, the popular disapproval of "The Big Five," and the growing trend toward socialization of industry and natural resources, the Zaibatsu as a class may not be as influential as they were a decade ago.

1 of 2

CONFIDENTIAL

In general, a man can rise to the upper financial brackets only through personal influence in high places, but there are exceptions. One of the most important of these is the Japanese custom of adoption, whereby a big-business man (or even a man of the nobility) may adopt a son or son-in-law if he has no sons of his own. If, for instance, a big-business man has no son or has a son uninterested in business matters, he may adopt an enterprising young man from his office staff.

The Zaibatsu as a group have been an object of envy and criticism by most other social groups in Japan, including the nobility, and in recent years they have attempted to prevent criticism by large public philanthropies and gifts of equipment for the military.

d. The Middle Classes. The upper middle class consists largely of business men and industrialists, the men who during the past decade eagerly pushed Japanese industrialization and foreign trade. Before the war they were beginning to own automobiles, patronize golf clubs, and enjoy many western luxuries. This upper middle class group is probably being hardest hit by the present war and its attendant government control of all aspects of Japanese life.

The lower middle class consists largely of the white collar workers, many of whom have been well educated in Japan's colleges and universities. Before the war, these people worked long hours for little pay, raised large families, and paid high taxes.

Most inhabitants of the small country towns are lower middle class retail merchants. The townsmen wear their hair "long," i.e., about like that of an American or European in contrast to the farmers who keep theirs closely cropped. This difference in haircuts reflects a whole series of cultural differences. The farmer regards the slick-haired townsman as a rather sharp trader, interested only

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in personal gain and rather frivolous play. The townsman, on the other hand, looks to the city for his values and regards the farmer as rather uncouth.

e. Technicians. This class, consisting of technical factory workers, was, before the war, of lower social status than the classes already described, but received higher incomes than most white collar middle class workers. They are a rising group today, just as the merchants were a rising group in feudal days.

f. Farmers. Farmers in general are regarded by city people of all the above classes as simple and honest, but hardly acceptable socially. Members of the military groups, however, many of whom originated in rural areas, have more respect for the farmer. Perhaps because of this fact army leaders see to it that the villages get at least a proportionate share of government disbursements.

Economically, farmers form the base of Japanese society today, as they have in the past. But, as in feudal days, the government policy toward them is that of a father toward his children -- to keep them reasonably healthy, peaceful, and frugal. The government is also very much interested in increasing the agriculturists' production. The first aim (to keep them healthy and peaceful) is accomplished by providing government relief to villagers in case of a flood or a drought, by providing government trained teachers who emphasize the values of peace and cooperativeness to the children in rural schools, and by leaving local matters up to local village governments. Increased production is stimulated by having in every village a government trained agricultural adviser to aid the farmers in applying new and improved agricultural techniques. In sum, while farmers are economically of the first importance, they are politically and socially of secondary importance.

CONFIDENTIAL

g. The Urban Proletariat. This group includes manual laborers, factory workers, miners, and the vast group of people, both men and women, who drive buses and streetcars and maintain other public services.

There is but little real organization among any of the proletarian groups -- a condition which contrasts sharply with that of most farmers, who are well organized within their own villages with cooperatives for purchasing, for marketing, and for credit, all affiliated with national cooperative associations. This is largely explained by the government's encouragement of farmers' marketing and credit associations, and strong disapproval of any real organization on the part of urban workers. Various labor unions have been organized in the past, but as a part of the Konoye program of national reorganization and unity, they were all dissolved, more or less voluntarily, in the same way in which the political parties were disbanded. The urban proletarians are at present lower in the national social hierarchy than the farmers.

h. The Eta. At the low end of the social ladder a hereditary class is again encountered. The Eta today form an out-caste group of over a million people, the descendants of several gradations of untouchables in feudal days. Popularly reggraded as descendants of Korean captives, the Eta as a group probably originated as an occupational caste associated with the killing of animals and tanning of leather, occupations regarded as ritually unclean under the Shogunate. Physically they are of the same racial stock as other Japanese. Since 1868 the Eta have been legally declared to be commoners, but a deep prejudice against them still persists and intermarriage of Eta and non-Eta is practically tabu. It is impossible for an Eta to rise very far in the army or navy, for the men would not have the proper respect for an officer of Eta origin. There is a special society, the Suiheisha, for the uplift of the Eta, which is aggressive in its attempts to

CONFIDENTIAL

prevent discrimination. It gains strength in times of peace, but is repressed in time of war.^{1/}

3. Special Groups. Two groups of people in Japan require special consideration -- the military and the bureaucrats.

a. The Military. The high military clique is known as the Gumbatsu. This controlling group of men is a relatively small one. Formerly most of the navy men came from the upper class groups of the Satsuma clan (in Kagoshima) and the army men from the Choshu clan (in Yowaguchi), but of recent years their social origins have become more varied. However, the upper military group remains uniquely independent of any outside control by civil authorities. This close concentration of control has aroused suspicion both within and without the services, and in 1935 a Colonel Aikawa assassinated the chief of the military officers' bureau (Major General Nagata) because of the latter's alleged acceptance of material benefits from financiers (of the Zaibatsu) in return for an agreement to suppress the Young Officers' movement.

The younger officers and the enlisted men in the army and navy are recruited from all over Japan and from all social classes. However, those who become officers usually are loyal to the patriotic, socialistic, military clique first, and to their native class and place of origin second. The strong antipathy of these younger men to the big financial interests, and even to their own superior officers if they suspect them of conniving with the financiers, is such as to make them sympathetic with the common people of Japan, especially the farmers and lower middle class urban

^{1/} See The Eta: A Persecuted Group, COI Bulletin No. 7, or for a fuller account, see Ninomiya's article on the Eta in the Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Second Series, vol. X, 1933.

^{2/} COI Bulletin No. 7, Japan's Cultural "Harm", March 7, 1942 (Restricted).

7/14/42 - 10/15/42 - 055 - Summary of the Proceedings of the War Relocation Authority

102

CONFIDENTIAL

33

'8

groups. However, their fanatic solidarity as a group probably does more to separate them from, than to unite them with, other groups in the nation.

b. The Bureaucrats. The other special group of people is the Kambatsu -- the higher ranks of the bureaucrats.

"The Civil Service is firmly entrenched in Japan. It is well protected from the influence of the political parties, and civil service promotion carries through to the position of vice-minister in the larger departments. Moreover, because of the prestige which government servants enjoy, many cabinet ministers have been chosen from among their ranks. Many retired government officials are appointed to the House of Peers or to the Privy Council, where they continue political influence without the burden of departmental responsibilities. The exclusiveness and homogeneity of this group is enhanced by the fact that the ranks of the higher administrative civil service, while recruited by competitive examination, are in fact made up largely of graduates of Tokyo Imperial University.

As a result of their power, their policies, and their relatively closed ranks, the bureaucrats are disliked by the party politicians, by private businessmen, and sometimes by the Army. Since they control the police, they are frequently unpopular among the people. During recent years many men from the civil services in Manchukuo and Korea have risen to important posts in Japan Proper. With the gradual elimination of the parties from cabinet control, the civil service has expanded its share in policy determination. The Tojo Cabinet, for example, is made up almost exclusively of military men and civil servants, with no representation of private business or of the political parties."^{1/}

^{1/} COI Bulletin No. 9, Japan's Cliques: The "Batsu," March 7, 1942 (Restricted).

Handwritten notes on the right margin: "The Civil Service is firmly entrenched in Japan. It is well protected from the influence of the political parties, and civil service promotion carries through to the position of vice-minister in the larger departments. Moreover, because of the prestige which government servants enjoy, many cabinet ministers have been chosen from among their ranks. Many retired government officials are appointed to the House of Peers or to the Privy Council, where they continue political influence without the burden of departmental responsibilities. The exclusiveness and homogeneity of this group is enhanced by the fact that the ranks of the higher administrative civil service, while recruited by competitive examination, are in fact made up largely of graduates of Tokyo Imperial University."

1 of 2

34 38
CONFIDENTIAL

The bureaucrats of Japan have been frequently criticized for those universal sins of bureaucracy in all nations -- inefficiency, red tape, and favoritism.

4. Women

a. General Social Position. Women in Japan, while belonging by birth and marriage to the general classes previously outlined, must also be considered as a group. The position of women in Japan is what is usually called, by American standards, "low." Women cannot vote, as a rule they are not educated beyond the high school level, and while a man may divorce his wife at will she cannot divorce him except for serious cause. Furthermore, men in urban and upper class groups leave their wives at home when they go out for social functions. If female society is desired, it is obtained by hiring geisha girls to sing and entertain.

In the home a woman by tradition is expected first to obey her father, then after marriage to obey her husband, and finally in widowhood to obey her eldest son.

Educational emphasis, beginning even before primary school, is designed to make a woman dutiful and patient. This produces in the middle classes a very sweet and docile woman, the Japanese ideal of wife and mother. Among the upper classes, women sometimes receive higher education, occasionally have an opportunity to travel abroad, and are encouraged to master some cultural art such as playing the musical koto or performing the tea ceremony. Since these upper class women have servants and are not expected to do household chores, they can devote more time to cultural and intellectual matters, but they are still expected to be dutiful wives and rarely accompany their husbands to any social events outside the home.

Among the poorer classes and on the farm, women are more nearly the equals of men. The economic interdependence of husband and wife may

102

CONFIDENTIAL

36

CONFIDENTIAL

35 38

have something to do with this. A peasant whose wife is a good farmer and at the same time a good household manager would hesitate to insult her or treat her badly for fear she might leave him, or simply fail to do her work. Socially, also, women of the rural and lower classes are less subordinated to men. At parties and banquets both men and women may participate, drinking, singing, and dancing. A farmer's wife is much freer in act and speech than a middle or upper class woman would ever dare to be.

b. Geisha and Joro. Prostitution in Japan is regulated by the government. Regular prostitutes (Joro) are usually signed on for a period of two or three years. While formerly a father could sell his daughter without her consent, this is no longer true. However, in a poor family, if a father puts pressure on his daughter to sign a contract there is not much she can do, since it is her duty to obey her father, and there is no concerted public opinion to back up any objections she may have.

she may have.

Geisha, in contrast to joro, are girls who have been trained in playing the samisen, singing, and providing generally pleasant female company at a banquet. Their traditions come down from the court ladies of old Japan. Geisha are licensed, but they do not have to sleep with their patrons. Most geisha, however, are more or less faithful mistresses to favored patrons. In small-town hostelrys, the distinction between geisha and joro is so thin as to be invisible, but in such cities as Tokyo the distinction is marked, and the successful geisha are usually girls of considerable wit and training.

Geisha have an important function in Japanese social organization. A wife is married for family reasons -- to bear children, mend clothes, and cook food. Her duty is to love her husband and to work for him. She is not like a servant because a servant does her work without love; she is better than a servant. But satisfactory and desirable though she may be in her limited sphere, the eternally

submissive wife leaves some masculine needs unsatisfied. Clever or seemingly clever female conversation, good-humored and sometimes ribald banter, amorous teasing, and the like are not to be had in a wife; but the small business man, village official, or other middle-class Japanese can find them in the geisha girl. Because of the greater freedom of peasant women the farmer has little need for this sort of stimulation.

c. Women's Organizations. Of recent years women have been organized into civic and patriotic organizations to assist at Reservist reviews, air raid drills, etc. This is a new development in Japanese life, quite contrary to the tradition that woman's place is in the home or in her husband's paddy field. While it has taken a lot of urging and organizing by Japanese men to persuade women to join these associations and see any useful function in them, they appear to have become quite important, especially in the urban areas.

Just as labor organizations grew up more or less under the guidance of fatherly employers, so now women's organizations are growing up under the fatherly guidance of school teachers and other male public leaders.^{1/}

F. Governmental and Social Control

1. Tokyo Group Rule. The national social structure of Japan is a complex one, rising from a broad population base of lower and middle classes throughout the country and centralized in Tokyo. Despite the drastic economic changes of the past 80 years, the social structure retains many features from Tokugawa feudal days. At the apex of the structure is the Emperor. Actual governmental control at the various levels of responsibility is the function of groups, or is carried out by a rotation of individuals rather than by a single, permanent, responsible head. Thus, in the Tokyo government there is a whole group of individuals, including members of the Privy Council, the Prime Minister, and the army and navy ministers,

^{1/} However, certain exceptional women -- such as the Baroness Ishimoto -- have in the past been instrumental in creating organizations aimed at improving the status of women.

all important, who collectively determine national policy in agreement with Japanese tradition, internal conditions of the country, and the world situation. By the Japanese system the heavy responsibility of national government is too great for any one human being; hence, one of the important functions of the sacred Emperor is to serve as the individual in whose name all acts of importance are carried out. Another function of the Emperor, as a symbol of the national tradition and as the "father" of his people, is to reinforce the social solidarity of Japan.

The ruling group serves as an advisory body to the Emperor and usually comes to its decisions only after considerable discussion and compromise. In the Cabinet organization the Prime Minister is not the leader of the group, but rather the coordinator of the group, and he cannot act without the agreement of the army and navy ministers. To affect governmental policy in a positive manner, it is necessary to affect representatives of several groups, not simply one or two. On the other hand, a determined army or navy leadership can cause a cabinet to fall through lack of cooperation.

2. Formal Governmental Structure

a. The Emperor and His Advisers.

Formalistically, the Japanese governmental structure is a constitutional monarchy, that is to say, there is a monarch, a constitution, and a parliament. The Emperor is regarded as the divine head of the vast family of the Japanese people, while the leading statesmen correspond to a council of clan elders. The Cabinet, which sometimes changes with remarkable frequency, is assembled by a prime minister nominally selected by the Emperor. It consists of the heads of various government departments and, in recent years, of a number of ministers without portfolio.

The army and navy ministers, who must be an active general and an active admiral, are responsible directly to the Emperor rather than to the Premier. If either of them refuses to agree to a cabinet decision and no other active general or admiral can be found to replace them, the cabinet falls. Furthermore, a new one cannot be formed until

CONFIDENTIAL

38

some general or admiral can be found who will serve as army or navy minister.

The Privy Council consists of a president, vice-president, twenty-four regular members who are appointed for life by the Emperor, and the cabinet ministers as members ex-officio. It gives advice to the Emperor on request. Military advice is given by the Supreme Command, made up of the heads of the army and navy general staff. Other Special Advisers to the Emperor include the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Minister of the Imperial Household, and the Grand Chamberlain. These men, especially the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, are often of great influence in the Emperor's decisions.

In times of crisis, when decisions of great importance are to be made, all important advisers gather in the presence of the Emperor. This Imperial Conference includes the Premier, the chief military advisers, the Lord Privy Seal, and a number of other important persons depending upon the nature of the decision. Full and final responsibility for the collective decisions arrived at in such a conference is accepted by each individual in attendance.

The Imperial Conference met just before the Manchurian Incident, just before the signing of the Tripartite Pact, and just before the recognition of the Wang Ching Wei regime. It also met in June after Germany attacked Russia. It is believed by some that at this last meeting the decision to fight the United States was made, providing this country did not back down in its Asia policy and pending the opportune moment -- which turned out to be December 7.

b. Group Representation among the Emperor's Counselors. Many of the Imperial advisors today are of the nobility, as for example, Prince Konoye. The big capitalists, despite their economic power, are less important as active determiners of government policy than might be expected. This is partly the result of the old feudal concept that merchants are less important than farmers. The military, on the other hand, have great traditional prestige, so that in the 1930's, when the importance of the capitalists

(U.S. Weekly Review, August 24-September 3, 1942).

192

39
CONFIDENTIAL

was growing, the army was still able to act independently of both capitalists and politicians in taking over Manchuria and launching on a career of external conquest and internal military domination. The capitalists, however, cooperated with the army, and in Manchuria certain new capitalists, such as Aikawa, attained prominence by helping develop the resources of that area. During the recent conquests in the south, the big industrialists of Japan have worked as an arm of the government in correlating the exploitation of these areas with the economy of the empire. But of course men of military background are of first importance in the Imperial advisory groups today.

c. The Diet. The parliament, or congress, in Japan is called the Diet and consists of a House of Representatives and a House of Peers. Members of the House of Representatives are elected by male voters over 25 years of age. In the 1920's this body was fairly influential, but of recent years it has become merely a body for approving cabinet decisions and voting funds for running the government. It has also a slight negative bargaining power; by refusing to act on a budget, it may obtain certain concessions from the government.

d. The Departments. The governmental departments are as follows: Home Affairs, Finance, Army, Navy, Justice, Education, Commerce and Industry, Agriculture and Forestry, Communications, Railways, Overseas Affairs, Welfare, Foreign Affairs.^{1/} A vast and strong bureaucracy has grown up with these government departments. The civil servants, holding their positions as the result of middle school or college education, come largely from cities or small towns and from middle and upper middle class families. Many of them have a mercantile background.

A civil service job in Tokyo is the goal of bureau workers, for positions in the capital carry the greatest prestige. Usually men are transferred from place to place every few years. The same rule

^{1/} The formation of a new Greater East Asia Ministry to conduct administrative affairs (political, economic, cultural) within the "Greater East Asia Sphere," excepting Japan Proper, Korea, Formosa, and Japanese Sakhalin, was recently announced by the Japanese radio (FBIS Weekly Review, August 28-September 3, 1942).

CONFIDENTIAL

40

applies to school teachers and policemen, and with them it serves some important functions. A school teacher, as the middleman of the Japanese cultural tradition, by being transferred every few years develops few local affiliations, and so retains his nationalistic outlook, which is carried into any small town or village where he teaches. Thus, the teachers serve as important links in the centralized nationalistic system. By influencing teachers one can influence a large section of the nation. Similarly, a policeman, being transferred from community to community retains a nationalistic point of view, and in addition, is prevented from settling down in one area, forming friendships with the local people, and so becoming lax in his duties.

The Japanese radio has recently announced a sharp contraction in the number of civil servants employed in the old line departments. Most of those dismissed have apparently been put into the new overseas administrative jobs made available by Japanese conquests.

e. Administrative Units. There are a number of recognized administrative units ranging from the national government in Tokyo to the little village or mura government of the rural areas. A mura is a collection of hamlets rather like a township, with locally elected officials. There is no county unit recognized administratively today, so the next unit above the mura is the prefecture or ken, of which there are 47 in all. Each prefecture has a governor appointed from Tokyo and a locally elected prefectural legislature which serves chiefly in an advisory capacity.

f. Village Government. The system of group rule extends all the way down to the smallest village hamlet. Local affairs in Japan operate within a local democratic framework. The headship of a hamlet usually rotates annually from one house head to another, so that no one person carries the burden of the responsibility indefinitely. The mura headman, unlike the hamlet (buraicu) head, is usually elected from the body of councilors (which, in turn, is elected by adult men with at least two years residence in the village) for a number of years and may be frequently reelected. In any important matter of local government, such as the budget, the headman can act only after extensive discussion with, and the complete agreement of, the village councilors. He is usually a person well liked by most of the villagers.

142

43
47
CONFIDENTIAL

The village headman has two important functions in the national social structure: to serve as official intermediary between the people of the village and all outsiders, official or unofficial, and to keep peace within the village. If there is a family quarrel, for instance, he may visit the man and wife and try to settle the matter by discussion. If a young man becomes obstreperous in his conduct, the headman may call him aside and give him a talking to.

The headman's function as middleman between the village and extra-village government bodies is typical of many aspects of Japanese life: the go-between plays an important role. In marriage arrangements, in the purchase and sale of livestock and property, in delicate negotiations between two people or two social groups, it is the Japanese pattern, by employing a neutral third party to act as go-between, to avoid face-to-face bargaining, which might lead to argument or irreparable loss of face to one party or the other.

g. Local vs Central Authority. At all but the highest levels of the government there is a combination of locally elected and government appointed officials. Despite the authoritarian and paternalistic aspects of the Japanese government, it does contain a strong element of democracy. One reflection of this is the fact that no Japanese likes to hold a position of responsibility too long. Another is the way in which, while things of national importance are decided unequivocally from Tokyo, things of local importance are left to the local governments. In the mura the headman is locally elected as are the village councilors; but the agricultural adviser is appointed by the prefectural Department of Agriculture, and the village school teachers by the prefectural Department of Education. The local Shinto priest receives his appointment from the prefectural government, but he is usually a local man recommended by the local headman. Thus, local affairs are locally administered, but agricultural efficiency and formal education, being of national importance, are directed by government officials indirectly controlled from Tokyo via the prefectural governments. Members of the prefectural assembly are popularly elected by men of the prefecture, but the prefectural governor is appointed from Tokyo.

1 of 2

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Forms of Social Control. There are today three main forms of social control: civil, military, and religious. These in turn are influenced by economic and geographic factors, a remote mountain village being less affected by a new ruling in Tokyo than a nearby town.

a. Civil Control. The civil organization has already been briefly summarized. It includes the political organization of the "democratic" prefectural legislatures and the Diet on the one hand and the "authoritarian" government-appointed prefectural governors and bureau heads on the other. The police system, extending to the remote outposts of the Empire, is a part of the civil government, as is also the educational system and the Department of Agriculture, with its trained agricultural advisers in every village.

b. Military Control. The military organization in Japan is divided into two sections: the army and the navy. The head of the army is the Emperor. Under him there is the military organization with its hierarchy from private to general, largely patterned on the German military system, which was adopted by the Japanese during the Meiji restoration. The modern army gained its first victories in suppressing Saigo Takamori's Satsuma Rebellion.^{1/}

(1) Social Origins of Army Recruits. In contrast to the hereditary military class before Meiji the modern army is based on universal conscription. Since rural youths constitute a majority in its ranks, the Japanese army is more closely allied in interest with the farmer than with either the nobility or the capitalist group.

(2) Army Discipline and Democracy. The Japanese army stresses strict discipline and complete faith in official Shinto and Emperor worship as a means of attaining this discipline and of maintaining morale. At the same time, the traditional democracy of

^{1/} Saigo is comparable to Lee in the United States, and is a great hero today in southern Japan.

43
CONFIDENTIAL

rural Japan also finds a place. Although officers rarely rise from the ranks, coming instead from special officer training schools, they participate in sports with the men. After army maneuvers there is a period of lengthy discussion and criticism. Young officers may present ideas for maneuvers, and if these are accepted, they are permitted to stand aside and watch the action, thus being able to see its good and bad points. In this and other ways the army is always striving to improve itself. Able young officers tend to be advanced relatively rapidly.

At the end of his period of military service, the conscript automatically joins the ranks of reservists. The reservists being more numerous and being older than the young men of a given community form the important local units of military control. They take charge of many local activities, such as seeing off new soldiers for the barracks, supervising school drills.

(3) The Navy. The navy is smaller and takes fewer conscripts than the army. It is therefore less closely associated with the farmer and more friendly with the noble and, indirectly, the capitalist classes. Although there has been a traditional rivalry between army and navy, the present war there has been remarkably well-coordinated action between all branches of the armed services.

As in the army, young naval officers have considerable freedom of expression, and bright young men gain rapid promotion. Indeed, both the army and navy have more mobility and adaptability to new conditions than might be expected from Japan's traditional emphasis on respect for elders and military discipline. Furthermore, due to the political power and prestige attached to high military rank in Japan, many of the best brains of the country take up a military career. This fact, plus a well-planned offensive, gave Japan a distinct initial advantage over the democracies in the present war.

c. Religious Control. Despite the importance of religion in Japanese life, there are no religious leaders of political importance. Buddhism is quite

102

14 18
CONFIDENTIAL

divorced from government, and Shinto in its formal official aspects is not so much a religious controlling factor as an organ of government, like the Emperor. If a religious leader should become prominent in Japanese affairs it may be taken as a sign of some important internal changes, probably for the worse. (See Sections I.G.1.d., below, State Shinto, and I.G.2., Religion as a Form of Social Control.)

d. People's Check on the Government. The Japanese have at their disposal several curbs on the unlimited exercise of governmental authority. One of these is assassination. Men who become conspicuous as responsible heads of some government group are sometimes assassinated by a representative of another group which strongly disapproves the policy of the first. It was in this way that certain military factions expressed their dislike of capitalist control of government by the assassination of Takahashi and others in 1936.

Another sanction is disobedience. Although Japanese are trained in respect for authority, if a young man becomes convinced that a leader is in the wrong, he may, at the risk of his own life, disobey instructions in such a way as to show his disapproval.

A third sanction is for a man to commit hara kiri on the doorstep of the man from whom he dissents. This last rather drastic sanction has not been utilized very often of recent years.

Because of these checks on their actions, the rulers of Japan dare not exercise their tremendous powers recklessly or without preparing all important groups for any new policy to be pursued. Such preparation is likely to include newspaper and radio publicity, public lectures, and various other measures. (See Section II.D., below, Japanese Domestic Propaganda.)

e. Government Leaders. It has already been pointed out that a characteristic of the high councils of state is the constant shifting of personnel. Sometimes civil forces are predominant, more often military (as at present), but no man is ever in absolute control as is true in Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy.

192

CONFIDENTIAL

Outside of local village affairs farmers have little say in the civil government except to appeal from time to time for relief in case of flood or drought. Similarly, the city proletariat has little voice in civil government. While workers and farmers form the majority of the people and may even riot from time to time in periods of economic stress, no major change in government can be expected to come directly from them. For governmental change one must look to the middle and upper classes from which governmental personnel are recruited and which for one reason or another may be dissatisfied with the status quo.

f. Recent Trends. During recent years, under the leadership of Prince Konoye, there has been a remarkable consolidation of the whole structure of Japanese social controls. Wherever possible there has been an amalgamation of similar overlapping organizations to create a new single organization more or less under government control. For example, in 1940 all political parties dissolved themselves in the interest of national solidarity to be replaced by an Imperial Rule Assistance Association.^{1/} This remarkable self-dissolution also took place among the labor organizations. Numerous power companies have been consolidated and brought under greater government control. Various patriotic societies have been amalgamated into larger over-all organizations. The number of newspapers and news agencies has been reduced until today there is only one official Japanese news agency, Domei, which, of course, gives the Tokyo government greatly increased power over public opinion. (See Section II.B.1., below, The Press.)

4. The Family in Social Control. All the previous forms of social control merge in the family, which is the basic unit of Japanese society. The Japanese family is a closely-knit social group, exercising strong control over its constituent members. The strength of the familial control over the behavior of a son, a father, a wife, or a daughter is reinforced both by law and by public consensus.

^{1/} However, the old political alignments still persist unofficially, and one or two strongly nationalistic parties, such as Tohokai, even reorganized themselves for a brief period, but have since dissolved again. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association as a new consolidation, imposed more or less from above, is a possible weak point in the present government set-up. On the IRAA see also, below, section II.C.1.b.

CONFIDENTIAL

a. Family Structure. The structure of the family is based on a patrilineal and patriarchal principle whereby each family has continuity for ages unending through the kinship tie extending from father to son to grandson. This tie is actively maintained by daily ancestor worship at the household Buddhist shrine. In order to preserve the unity and continuity of the family, it is the duty of a son to marry and produce male descendants. If no son is born, a man may adopt a boy, and so create a male descendant by legal fiction. Any misdeed of a son or daughter is a reflection on the family name -- a name that should never die out and should never be tarnished. Within the family the father is head of the house, but the wife takes care of household affairs, child education, and preliminary marriage arrangements.

For such matters of great importance as a marriage, a death, buying or selling of land, the house head calls in members of the extended family, who come together as a family council to celebrate, mourn, or consult as the occasion demands.

While an individual has many duties toward his family -- obedience to parents (especially the father), good conduct outside the home, and care of the ancestral spirits -- the family also has duties toward the individual, especially that of caring for him in all times of crisis. If, for instance, a member of the family has gone to the city and failed, he may come home and again share the family roof and board. This is one reason why industrial Japan has never had large numbers of men classified as "unemployed."

b. Family Control. The family is the basic unit of civil control, each house head in a town or village being responsible to the local authorities for the good conduct of his household. In the system of military control nearly every family plays a part, either through having a son as a conscript soldier or through having an ex-soldier as a reservist. Furthermore, every reservist in a family serves as a living example to the sons of the household of the military duties of a Japanese.

c. Family Religion. In religious matters the family is the most important unit in the Buddhist

CONFIDENTIAL

organization. Through Buddhist funeral services and memorial ceremonies for the spirits of the deceased, family solidarity and family group attitudes are reinforced.

Popular Shinto^{1/} is not important in family affairs except insofar as it provides a body of common beliefs and practices for all members of the group. State Shinto, on the other hand, with its emphasis on the familial aspect of the nation -- a father Emperor with subject children -- points up the individual family organization by indirectly endorsing the scheme of a male head of the family, who is responsible for the members of his family, they in turn owing him love and self-sacrifice.

The family, then, serves many important functions in connection with education, discipline, and social security. Furthermore, it is the basic unit in social control in civic affairs, military matters, and religion.

d. Effects of Urbanism on the Family. In urban centers family unity is weaker than in rural areas, but it is not nearly so weak as in individualistic United States with its frontier background. Much of the rapid increase in Japan's population during the past 60 years is tied up with the movement of excess rural population to cities, and the large-scale migration of individuals involved has separated the members of many Japanese families in time and space. On the one hand, this has decreased the strength of familial control and facilitated the centralization of governmental control by making it relatively easy for the government deliberately to sway public opinion in the atomistic urban society through newspapers, speeches, and the radio. On the other hand, it is setting the stage for class consciousness and class loyalty, as opposed to an exclusive family loyalty, and may some day enable an independent public opinion -- especially at the worker level -- to arise.

^{1/} See Section I.G., below, Religious Beliefs and Practices, for distinctions between Buddhism, Popular Shinto and State Shinto.

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407

G. Religious beliefs and practices.

1. The forms of religion. There are three important forms of Japanese sacred beliefs and practices: Buddhism, Popular Shinto, and State Shinto.

a. Buddhism. Nearly every family in Japan belongs to one Buddhist sect or another, the most popular being the Japanese salvationist Shin Sect (Shinshu). Buddhist household practices involve daily rituals before the ancestral tablets, and thus serve to give unity to the family group. All matters concerning the after-life, such as funerals and memorial services for deceased relatives, are looked after by the local Buddhist priest.

Most of the big Buddhist sects have headquarters in Kyoto, the old pre-feudal capital of Japan. Buddhist priests, after a period of training at a theological seminary in Kyoto, go out to some temple where they may spend a lifetime looking after the spiritual needs of their parishioners. Formerly these Buddhist priests, as educated men, served as the teachers and leaders in their local communities and kept the vital statistics of the district in their temple records. But today with Government-trained school teachers and regular Government census records, the Buddhist priest has lost much of his former power and prestige. Active temple members today are mostly women and old people.

The major Buddhist sects are Shinshu, Zen, and Nichiren.

Shinshu (16,045 priests),^{1/} a salvationist sect. All true believers who have faith in the Savior Amida (Buddha) and repeat sincerely the invocation, Namu Amida Butsu, expect to go to Amida's western heaven after death. Shinshu is the religion of the masses, both urban and rural. While many of its leaders were politically important in feudal days, today the priests have little influence outside their own temples.

Zen (12,472 priests). Membership in this sect is smaller than that of Shinshu, but it has high prestige among intellectuals on the one hand and military men on the other. A Zen devotee depends for enlightenment on intensive physical and mental

^{1/} Figures on Buddhism from Far East Yearbook for 1941.

discipline, and lays stress on purity of motive, regardless of the actions necessary to attain one's ends, all of which is also characteristic of the zealous patriot.

Nichiren (4,497 priests). Founded by Saint Nichiren, (1222-1282) this sect is aggressive and nationalistic.

There are a number of other sects, more important in the past than at present, as for instance Tendai and Shingon. Altogether there are (as of 1937) 55,510 Buddhist priests, with a total Buddhist temple membership of over 42 million. Presumably this last figure is based on official temple membership and is an understatement of the number of people, including women and children, who practice Buddhism in one form or another.

Buddhist priests are subject to conscription just like anyone else. They have but little political power, and since they deal largely with old people, women, and children, they play a minor role in the direct social control of contemporary Japan. But indirectly they are important, for they serve to soothe the common people with their talk of Amida's paradise and in this sense help make poor people satisfied with their lot. In Japan it may be said with some fairness that the popular forms of Buddhism serve as an opiate for the people.

b. Popular Shinto. Popular Shinto beliefs are of many kinds and include a wide variety of local spirits and deities, honored by wayside shrines. Spirits of the well, the kitchen, the forest; deities associated with prosperity and good crops; patron deities of hamlets and villages -- all are included in the polytheistic popular Shinto beliefs. These beliefs are held by practically all Japanese subjects, including those who are also Buddhists.

The sacred beliefs and practices of popular Shinto serve to unify local groups of people, who may be protected by the same patron deities honored in a local village shrine. Most Japanese soldiers who go overseas take with them as an amulet a small package of earth from some shrine or sacred mountain. A woman may wear a Shinto talisman about her stomach to make childbirth easy. Local deities and sacred places are often the object of rites to ensure good health and to protect crops. Popular Shinto gives a man confidence in the face of the uncertainties of life, while Buddhism looks after his immortal soul.

c. Shinto sects. In addition to such beliefs and practices, there are thirteen formally organized sects of Shinto, such as Tenrikyo, which are comparable in function to Buddhist sects. While the ordinary popular Shinto beliefs do not interfere with Buddhist beliefs, members of a Shinto sect are more exclusive and are not members of a Buddhist sect. A member of a Shinto sect, for instance, is buried according to special Shinto rites, instead of the more usual Buddhist ones.

d. State Shinto. The government distinguishes between such general religious beliefs as the above and the special sacred beliefs and practices associated with nationalism, the Emperor, and his deified ancestors. Especially important among the latter are the Divine Imperial ancestress Amaterasu O Mikami, Jimmu Tenno, by tradition the first ruler of Japan, and the Emperor Meiji, during whose reign Japan turned from feudalism to western industrialism. Ceremonies associated with this State Shinto are regularly performed in local village shrines, as well as in the great national shrine of Ise.

This shrine, in Mie prefecture, is the holy of holies of Shinto. Here resides the spirit of Amaterasu O Mikami, the sacred ancestress of the Emperor. To visit Ise, or have a sacred paper talisman from it, is to gain merit and also to have sacred protection. At New Year's time special talismans and calendars are distributed from Ise to every household in Japan through the local Shinto priests. They cost 10 sen each, and the money thus realized helps to maintain the national shrine.

A series of annual ceremonies are held at Ise, including the Spring Festival, Meiji Day, Jimmu Tenno Day, the Autumn Festival, and New Year's, all of which are at the same time celebrated in every small town and village shrine throughout the nation.

Another shrine of national importance is the Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo, where is housed Hachiman, patron deity of war. Here are enshrined the souls of soldiers killed in Japan's wars.

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51

Because of the association of State Shinto with the Emperor, the army, which acts in the name of the Emperor, finds it desirable to emphasize these beliefs in order to create in soldiers a conviction of carrying out a sacred duty in all their activities. The army and navy both emphasize the teachings of official Shinto, and military men are strong Shintoists, often not professing Buddhism at all, even looking upon it as a foreign religion. It is significant that in the Japanese army State Shinto is the only form of sacred belief officially maintained.

While Buddhism and Popular Shinto rites are classified as religions, State Shinto has been formally declared to be not a religion. Therefore, the constitutional guarantee of freedom of worship does not interfere with the rule that all children bow to the Emperor and participate in official rites at a Shinto Shrine in connection with Amaterasu or other Imperial ancestors.

The village Shinto priest receives his appointment from the prefectural Bureau of Shrines, which in turn is under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Shrines in Tokyo. There are about 16,000 officially recognized Shinto priests in Japan. On the whole, they are more nationalistic than the Buddhist priests. The ideas of nationalism associated with State Shinto are disseminated through the schools in the teaching of ethics.

The beliefs in regard to the Emperor, his ancestors, and the deities who created Japan and the Japanese serve the very important function of uniting all the little villages and hamlets, all the towns and cities, into a united nation, with a solidarity based on common sacred beliefs. Together with the attributes of Japanese national spirit taught in the school system, State Shinto is an important factor in producing the characteristic Japanese pride in Nippon's race and culture.

c. Christianity. Despite the extensive efforts of missionaries, there are but few Christians in Japan today -- 334,898 (1937), ¹/₂ or less than one half of one per cent of the population. A few

¹/₂ Source: Far East Yearbook for 1941.

141-1
Rundt: OSS
Sept 1944
Shintoism - State Shinto

142

of these, found mostly in and around Nagasaki, are Catholics, descendants of converts made by the Portuguese in the 16th Century.

Protestants, most of them converts since 1868, are found largely in urban or suburban areas. Such Christians are often "reformed" people, who take up Christianity as a symbol of giving up drinking, smoking, and loose living. Today all the Christian missions have been taken over by native Japanese at the request of the government. While the number of converts has been few, and while Christianity in Japan has been strongly modified to bring it into harmony with State Shinto, the ideas of Christian missionaries in regard to education and public health, and even morals, have had an important influence in Japan. Furthermore, they have made a number of good friends for the United States, who, while not in evidence today, will doubtless reappear under more auspicious circumstances, just as the Catholic families of Nagasaki kept their convictions in secret during the two hundred years of the Tokugawa regime when belief in Christianity was a capital offense.

f. Islam. There are an insignificant number of Moslems in Japan, and not all of them are Japanese. However, the government has given Islam official recognition, and mosques were erected in Tokyo and Kobe under government auspices a few years ago. This official interest in Islam has been of a political nature, Japan desiring to win the friendship of Moslems in China and more especially in southeast Asia and India.

g. Confucianism. Confucian ideas came into Japan in the sixth and seventh centuries along with numerous other elements of Chinese culture, especially in the field of governmental organization. The Japanese have emphasized those elements of Confucianism which fit in with Japanese ideology, especially the stress on personal loyalty and the proper relations of subject and ruler. They neglected those aspects which conflicted with the Japanese feudal system such as the right of revolution against the Emperor. Today Confucianism is being exploited by the Japanese for political purposes in Manchuria and North China.

CONFIDENTIAL

54

or "it is rainy", rather than with "Hello" or "How do you do". Each season, indeed each month, has its characteristic symbols -- usually flowers, trees, or grasses appropriate to the time of year. Many Shinto festivals, too, celebrate seasonal events, such as New Year's, Spring and Autumn.

In addition to the seasonal cycle there is a lunar cycle, the 15th of each lunar month (full moon) being the occasion for some festivities in most rural areas.

Religious and seasonal festivals give variety to rural life and form an important recreation for the people. They are occasions for relatives to visit one another (New Year's), or as on a trip to a shrine festival, for young people to meet and enjoy one another's company.

Of recent years and especially in urban areas holidays have become more or less commercialized, affording shopkeepers a good opportunity to sell their wares. Furthermore, the government in its attempts to streamline the national structure and increase production has usually ignored the old lunar seasons and their associated festivals.

A list of the more important festival days, along with other historic dates will be found in Appendix A. Most of them are celebrated according to the Gregorian calendar in urban areas and by schools and officials even in rural areas, but the country people celebrate many holidays such as New Year's and O Bon (the festival of the dead) according to a lunar calendar.^{1/}

Every house in Japan has a calendar on which both Gregorian and lunar dates are given. By law, the Gregorian dates are in large print, the lunar in small, but it is the lunar series, with its accompanying data on lucky and unlucky days, that is of greatest significance to a farmer. Since most possible listeners to American radio programs will be urban officials, the Gregorian dates are the best ones to follow for radio broadcasting.

^{1/} For a lunar calendar of Rural Festivals, see John Imbree, Suze Kura, pp. 268-98, Chicago, 1939.

192

II. National Holidays are marked by official Shinto ceremonies in every Shinto Shrine in the country, by the closing of schools and government offices, and by the display of the national flag in almost every household. Most National Holidays are more carefully observed by urbanites and officials than by country people, who observe their own series of folk holidays according to the lunar calendar.

Because of the great importance of seasonal events to the Japanese, and because of the affective associations which particular anniversaries or holidays have for them, the correlation of any propaganda or psychological warfare plan with the calendar is of particular importance. The list of important dates in Appendix A is not complete, but will suggest some ways in which this correlation can be effected.

The National Holiday of the 15th day of the 8th month, known as the Mid-Autumn Festival, is one of the most important of the Japanese holidays. It is a day of great significance to the Japanese people, and is celebrated with great enthusiasm. The festival is a time of great joy and celebration, and is a time when the Japanese people gather together to celebrate the festival. The festival is a time of great joy and celebration, and is a time when the Japanese people gather together to celebrate the festival.

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Japanese National Holidays: 1955 Supplement to the Handbook of Japan

II. CHANNELS OF INDOCTRINATION OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE

A. Education

1. Informal Educational Influences. The earliest and closest bonds of a child in Japan are those with his mother. The mother feeds and bathes the child daily and sleeps next to him at night. A strong bond of love often develops between a child and his mother which persists through life despite the many restrictions placed upon it by Japanese society.

The child first receives recognition from the community a few days after birth at a naming ceremony, and from the gods a month after birth at a shrine-visiting ceremony.

The mother nurses her child for several years, or until the next child is born. Weaning is gradual and in itself causes little trouble. More drastic is the child's training in cleanliness and control of the excretory functions. Japanese children must learn early to indicate when they wish to urinate or defecate. They acquire with this training an almost ritualistic attitude toward cleanliness, so that when they grow up even the poorest man feels the need of a daily bath. (Much of Shinto ritual is also of a purificatory nature.)

During the first year a child, especially a boy child, is the favored one in the family. At any time he may drink milk from his mother's breast, and whatever he cries for will be granted him. When his mother bears another baby she devotes her attention to the newcomer, turning over the first child to the care of an older brother or sister or nurse-maid. This sudden removal of the mother's attention frequently results in repeated and protracted temper tantrums. Eventually, however, the child becomes acquainted with other two and three-year-olds put out to play and accepts his altered position in the family.^{1/}

^{1/} A detailed analysis of the effects on adult personality of the earliest influences on a Japanese child is made by Geoffrey Gorer in Is Japanese Character Structure and Propaganda. Copies of this may be obtained from Dr. Gregory Bateson, Council on Intercultural Relations, American Museum of Natural History, N.Y.C.

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Records: OSS
Supplied by Committee Planning Sec. - 100-1-105

CONFIDENTIAL

57

Even in the pre-school years a boy is educated somewhat differently from his sister. On a walk to a festival the mother may tell the daughter to walk behind the son because she is a little lady, he a little gentleman. Furthermore, a first son will receive preferred treatment over his younger brothers. This extreme attention to, and 'spoiling' of, sons doubtless accounts in part for the pride of the adult male and his easy susceptibility to real or supposed insult. Japanese girls, on the other hand, trained to obedience, grow up as peaceful and patient, if somewhat ignorant, women, making ideal Japanese wives and mothers.

At six years of age all children begin attending school. First there is a visit to the local Shinto shrine, where teachers and older children gather for a brief Shinto ritual. The priest gives the young a little talk on the virtues and greatness of Japan, the Emperor, and the gods, then hands out a first year book of 'ethics'¹ published by the Department of Education.

At school the child meets for the first time children from all over his village or township. His constant association with them during the years of elementary school is an important one, and the ties of men who were classmates in school are usually very close. (This is even more true of men who were classmates in higher schools and colleges. To have been the classmate of a prominent financier or military man is a great aid to success in the business world or in the army.)

General agreement among parents and elders as to how a child should behave makes the enforcement of uniform standards relatively easy. Both in and out of school children learn to obey through a number of special sanctions. Corporal punishment is very rare; more common and most effective is the punishment of ridicule. Children learn early to fear ridicule, and the adult Japanese is always

¹ These books, one for each grade, are largely concerned with national civics, the virtue of being a soldier and of revering the Emperor, as well as the more ethical subjects of filial piety, honesty, etc.

careful to conduct himself in such a way as to avoid its sting. To be ridiculed is to lose dignity and self respect, i.e., to "lose face."

2. Government System. Japan is today one of the most literate countries in the world, with over 90 per cent of her population able to read and write. (But see Section II. A. 3., below, Literacy.) This is due largely to her extensive public school system under the supervision of the Department of Education in Tokyo. At present the Japanese system comprises the following main types of school.

a. Elementary School (Shogakko). This was until 1941 a six-year course, but is today an 8-year course required of every child in the nation. Money to pay the teachers in these schools comes in part from local taxes and in part from prefectural and national funds. The teachers are government appointees trained in government normal schools. Altogether there are 25,906 schools, with 11,793,000 pupils and 268,700 teachers.^{1/}

The curriculum of the elementary schools is basically one of learning to read and write about two thousand characters, some elementary geography, arithmetic, and history, a little general science, and generous doses of athletics, ethics, and singing. The elementary education also stresses love and respect for the soldier. One of the first songs learned in school, for instance, is about the "beautiful" Japanese soldier.

Character training, regarded as an essential of all Japanese education, is inculcated by lectures and stories and by practice. The children are taught the virtues of bravery and self-sacrifice through stories of Japanese heroes. The virtues of work and self-sufficiency are emphasized by having children responsible for keeping the schoolrooms and schoolyard neat and clean. Children are also expected to put up with various discomforts, such as cold in winter, and complaints are answered by telling them to think of the hardships of Japanese

^{1/} 1938 figures in this chapter from the Far East Yearbook, 1941.

7/11/41
1. Elementary Schools: 25,906
2. Secondary Schools: 1,179
3. Higher Education: 1,179

soldiers in Manchuria. Respect for superiors is instilled by teaching the children always to obey the teacher's orders.

In the elementary schools practically all children are promoted every year, the emphasis in teaching being more moral than intellectual. Teachers feel that if some child were left behind his class he would feel very badly about it, and that the resulting psychological effect and family chagrin would not be compensated for by any good the child might receive mentally from repeating the school grade. Similarly, at school athletic contests all entrants, not only the first three, receive prizes, and so no one feels unduly slighted. While occasionally people are shown the virtues of initiative and leadership, they are more often shown the virtues of cooperation, and the good but mediocre child is held to be superior to the bad and brilliant one.

Beginning with the first grade all Japanese students wear a standard dark uniform, acquiring in physical appearance as in mental attitude the homogeneity so much desired by Japanese educators.

The wealth of a community can usually be judged by the condition of its school building, built largely through local taxes. It is nearly always the finest building in the village or town, for the people take pride in their schools. A good school building also reflects in a symbolic way the Japanese love for their children.

The building usually serves as a house for adult education as well as a children's school house. Public lectures, plays, and various entertainments are frequently given in the main auditorium. Various civic associations, such as the Young People's Society, the Army Reservists, and the Women's Patriotic Associations, may also use the school building as a place in which to hold meetings.

Emperor's Portrait. In most schoolyards there is a special fireproof structure in which is kept the Emperor's portrait. The portrait is kept there at all times except when taken out for special ceremonies. Anyone entering or leaving the school grounds must bow toward this building as a sign of

loyalty to the Emperor. Thus, the school house, together with the Shinto shrine, serves as a center for inculcating by precept and ritual national patriotism for the Emperor, his sacred land, and the people that are his.

b. Young People's Schools (Seinengakko). These schools are organized in conjunction with the young men's and young women's associations and provide some instruction for elementary school graduates who do not go to middle school. Classes are often held during the afternoon or evening. The curriculum is largely one of drill and some vocational training for the boys, and sewing and home economics for the girls.

c. Middle School (Chugakko). This is a higher school for boys -- mostly boys from towns and cities. Attendance covers a five-year period. It corresponds roughly to high school in the United States except that fewer students attend. However, those intending to go on to Kotogakko (preparatory schools, see e. below) may do so after four years in Chugakko.

d. Agricultural and Other Technical Schools. These are vocational schools on the same level as the Middle Schools. The sons of well-to-do farmers who intend to make a career of farming attend the agricultural school nearest to their native village. Sons of small town businessmen attend the nearest commercial school. Of recent years there has been much emphasis laid on specialized vocational training, especially in the urban areas. In 1933 there were 1355 technical schools with 478,000 students.

e. Preparatory Schools (Kotogakko). There are 32 special schools preparatory to the university on somewhat the same level as our junior colleges. They have a three-year course and admit graduates of middle schools. There are also 179 vocational schools on this same academic level -- higher agricultural schools, higher commercial schools, etc., as well as 101 normal schools for teacher training.

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CONFIDENTIAL

62

After the elementary school there is a sharp drop in school enrollment due in part to the fact that examinations must be passed before entering middle school and technical schools and in part to the fact that free education is not provided beyond the elementary school level. In 1938, 11,793,000 pupils were attending elementary schools, but only 1,296,000, two-thirds of whom were boys, were in middle schools or technical schools of comparable grade, and only 73,000 in universities.

3. Literacy. Japan's impressive array of schools has produced a high degree of literacy in its population -- 92 per cent is claimed.^{1/} Literacy, however, is a very difficult term to define. With countries using alphabets, once a person can read and handle 26 letters, he can usually read a newspaper; but two men, both of whom can read a Hearst editorial, may differ widely in their degree of literacy. In Japan, a country using ideographs, the situation in regard to literacy is considerably more complex. There are Kobo Daishi's two sets of 51 syllable characters in current use. But, once having mastered these 102 signs, a child is still unable to read anything outside a primary school reader for the first or second grade. To read a newspaper one must learn about two thousand characters in addition to knowing the two sets of syllable signs. On leaving elementary school a bright student may know two thousand characters, but the chances are that he will not. If exposed to no further schooling for a few years the average country child, especially if a girl, is unable to read a newspaper or write a letter. There have been sporadic but rather unsuccessful attempts to persuade the government to adopt roman letters, at least in elementary schools, but there seems to be no prospect of this radical simplification in the near future. Indeed, it is doubtful if the government really desires to make true literacy too easy of attainment by the masses, for then they would be too easily exposed to "dangerous thoughts".^{2/}

^{1/} Nippon, A Charted Survey, p. 429 (figure as of 1931).

^{2/} There has been some mention in recent broadcasts from Japan of a plan for a simplified series of characters for teaching Japanese in the recently conquered Malayan and Indonesian regions.

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CONFIDENTIAL

63

There are two interesting sidelights on the question of literacy -- newspapers and libraries. In rural Japan no more than one household in ten or twelve subscribes to a paper, partly because of poverty, but also because of the scarcity of individuals who could read enough of it to make it worth buying. Moreover, Japanese farmers are not very much interested in politics either at home or abroad.

Besides this dearth of newspapers outside urban regions, there is a marked lack of libraries in rural Japan. Most schools have a few books in a reception room or special library room, but the books there are for the most part, of interest only to the teachers. Among the farmers themselves one house in a neighborhood of twenty or so may have a bookshelf. Such a house is always the home of someone of higher education. Again, poverty as well as illiteracy must be kept in mind in evaluating these facts.

4. Aims in Education. The basic aim of Japanese educators is to produce a literate and peaceable population, a population with all the knowledge necessary to get along in the modern world, but not of such a nature as to question the ways of Japanese culture. (It may be remembered that the scholars had a hand in bringing about the downfall of the Tokugawa.)

The educational system being preponderantly a government supported one, it is well fitted for the purpose of dispensing knowledge in just the proper quantity and quality. The outstanding traits of this education are patriotism, obedience to authority, and unquestioning acceptance of dogma. The basic code for all Japanese educators is embodied in the rescript of the Emperor Meiji on education issued in 1891. The text of this Imperial Rescript is given herewith:

"Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to

CONFIDENTIAL

64

generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious; as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.

The Way set forth here is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may all thus attain to the same virtue."

The strong emphasis on moral values as well as intellectual attainments embodied in this rescript is carried out in all Japanese education. Courses in ethics and morals are given in every year of a child's education from first grade to the last year of college. Some good examples of the way in which this is done are the following lessons from the Morals textbooks used in elementary school.^{1/}

^{1/} As quoted in Fortune magazine, September 1936, p. 102.

July 1, 1941
1. Imperial Rescript: OSS Supplement
2. Imperial Rescript: Moral Education
3. Imperial Rescript: Moral Education

"Genrokuro Furuhashi was the first village master of Inahashi Village and served faithfully for the cause of the villagers until his death, encouraging them to raise horses, cultivate silkworms, and to save money. (Teachers note -- Genrokuro's achievements are the right type of loyalty to the Emperor and to parents during peacetime. This must be strongly emphasized in this lesson.)"

Cooperation

"About 260 years ago five village masters united in order to utilize the water of a river for the irrigation of the fields. They succeeded after very great difficulties. (Teachers note -- You must warn against cooperation for doing wrong.)"

Whenever an official visits a rural district to talk about economic reconstruction or taxation or any other subject, the talk is always linked with patriotism, with love of Japan and

CONFIDENTIAL

66

reverence for the Emperor. During the ten years before 1942 public speakers indicated a continuous crisis in the nation's affairs owing to suspicious foreigners, vicious Russia, unfaithful and insincere China. At the same time the people are endlessly told: "We are a peculiar people -- descended from the gods and of superior flesh. Our Emperor comes down in one unbroken line [not a fact] for 2600 years. While other nations kill (Russia) or dispose (Germany) their kings, we revere ours as our father".^{1/}

All school teachers as civil servants trained in government normal schools owe their primary loyalty to the central government rather than to any particular region to which they may be appointed for a couple of years or so. As such they are well fitted to instill the nationalism which is so important a phase of Japanese education today. They tend to accept without question all educational directives issued by the Department of Education in Tokyo.

The enquiring mind is encouraged along lines of mechanical inventions, medicine, and bacteriology, but any enquiries into the causes of human behavior and the origins of the present social order are definitely suppressed. Even mildly original ideas expressed by a professor of history or political science are enough to get him expelled from his university.

5. Recent Trends in Education. A criticism leveled against the school system by the Japanese themselves is to the effect that too many young men receive college educations, especially in some of the private colleges of lower academic standing, and then cannot find jobs of sufficient prestige. This unemployment of the highly educated became enough of a problem for various ministers of education to worry about, and Minister Hirao in 1936 made a number of proposals to remedy it, including (a) lengthening to eight years the compulsory elementary education, (b) reduction of the number

^{1/} Japanese royalty has been murdered too, but this fact is ignored by the school teachers and public speakers.

CONFIDENTIAL

67

of higher schools and providing in them more vocational and personality training to fit the graduates for adult life -- thus students would come to regard the middle school more as a completion of education than simply a step toward the University, (c) reducing the number of years of schooling necessary to enter the University, and (d) reducing the number of private universities, especially those of lower standards.

Most of Hirao's proposals have since become fact -- the lengthening to eight years of compulsory education, revisions in middle school curricula, an increase in vocational training, and the reduction by two years of the preparatory schooling necessary for university entrance. It is more than likely that in the future the number of private universities will be reduced, and that students will be encouraged to attend their local government or Imperial universities rather than flocking to Tokyo.

144-1-1-1
Hirao's OSS Summary of Educational Proposals - 1945

192

CONFIDENTIAL

68

B. Mass communications

1. The press. Before 1868 news spread in Japan by word of mouth, except in certain cities like Osaka and Yedo (Tokyo), where broadsheets somewhat like those of Elizabethan England appeared. Since the Restoration the Japanese press has developed rapidly and is today comparable to that of any Western nation.

a. General newspaper situation. Japan, like England, is primarily a country of a few large newspapers with nation-wide circulation. Daily circulation is about six million -- an average of one copy for every twelve persons.^{1/} Two Osaka papers, Mainichi and Asahi, have circulations of two million each, if their regional editions are included. Their respective sister papers in Tokyo, Nichi-Nichi and Asahi, have circulations well over one million.

Since 1936 the government has reduced the number and size of newspapers and the number of editions printed. This was done in part to relieve the paper shortage and in part to facilitate governmental control. The number of dailies dropped from a maximum of 1200 in 1936 to 900 in 1939 and has probably declined even further since then. Of these 900 daily newspapers, only some twenty or thirty have circulations of over 20,000, and many do not really deserve the name of newspaper.^{2/}

Until shortly before the war, Japanese newspapers were "Americanized" -- large headlines and frequent extras, editorials relegated to a position distinctly secondary to that of "news", Sunday editions lavishly illustrated and provided with fictional and other supplementary material.

In the process of publication they combine ancient and modern technique. Rotary presses are used, but type is usually set by hand. News-men employ both telegraph and carrier pigeons, the latter particularly for photographs.

^{1/} The statistical material in this section is necessarily based upon Japanese sources. The figures used, however, are consistent with the estimates of dependable foreign observers.

^{2/} Details on the larger Japanese newspapers appear in Appendix B.

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War - 1942-1945

69

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192

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(2) Pre-publication bans and censorship.
Advance bans on the publication of certain items of information are issued, chiefly by the Department of Home Affairs and the Department of Foreign Affairs, although the police and district courts use them too. Such bans are occasionally specific, but usually enforce a general policy of silence on major governmental moves prior to their actual consummation.

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CONFIDENTIAL

70

They are often supplemented by anonymous suggestions from government interests, sometimes backed up by threats or blackmail.

Most actual censorship is done by the local police, although the Department of Home Affairs also directly exercises such functions. The police inspect the proof of all newspapers and frequently seize complete issues.

(3) Information monopolies. The Japanese government has established virtually complete monopolies on news and information of both foreign and domestic origin. Perhaps the most extensive control over the newspapers lies in the semi-official status of the news agency, Domei, which has a complete monopoly of foreign news and is the largest single purveyor of domestic news and photographs. Also important is the Cabinet Information Board, created in the summer of 1940 through the consolidation of the Information Bureaus of the various ministries. This board controls virtually all official news except for occasional independent statements from army and navy officials. Through press conferences and the like it is able to lay down news policies which the papers find it advisable to follow.

These information monopolies not only assist the government in preventing certain kinds of material from reaching the public by permitting the suppression of undesired items at the source, but also enable the government to dictate positive emphases and news slants at will.

As a consequence of the controls described above and of other wartime measures, such as the recent government-ordered consolidations, the newspapers have more and more been forced to become purely "publications of the Nation and the people ... furthering propaganda".

c. Press freedoms. While Japanese newspapers are tightly circumscribed in handling certain kinds of news, they have considerable latitude in other directions -- or did have prior to Japan's actual entry into the war and particularly prior to 1940. They have never been censored for anti-foreign or anti-democratic tirades, and these have been frequent and violent.

CONFIDENTIAL

71

Individual politicians, Cabinets, the Diet, and some individual laws could be criticized, provided the slant was jingoistic. Very lax libel laws have permitted mud-slinging and the revelation of the most intimate sorts of scandalous behavior of individuals.

d. Influence of the press. Newspapers and magazines have been very important media for the introduction of Western ideas. During liberal periods, the newspapers have often been in the vanguard of liberalism, although at all times they have been nationalistic and even chauvinistic. They have certainly played an important role in opinion-forming in the urban areas. As representatives and creators of public opinion they have at times wielded great political power, making or breaking cabinets. During recent years most newspapers, more or less voluntarily, have been ahead of official Japanese policy in advocating imperial expansion.

It is possible, however, to exaggerate the influence of the press. In rural regions, where political interest is low and the older customs are stronger, the printed word is much less influential than personal contacts. In these regions average newspaper circulation is about one paper for every ten or twelve families, rather than one for every twelve persons.

e. Foreign language press. Since the "opening" of Japan in 1853-4, foreign language newspapers have existed in numbers quite out of proportion to the small number of foreigners they served. These papers have frequently been subsidized either by the Japanese government or by foreign interests. The great majority have been English language papers, although French and German papers have also existed. As Japan entered the war there were three English language papers, the Japan Times and Advertiser, the Japan Herald, and the English edition of Nichi-Nichi, as well as a number of weeklies and monthlies. All were Japanese controlled at that time, although earlier the first two had been independently owned by Americans and British, respectively.

144-1-1-1
61
Kinds: OSS
Supporting
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Handbook
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142

CONFIDENTIAL

72

f. Magazines. In addition to newspapers, there are numerous weekly and monthly periodicals published in Japan. These, like the newspapers, have decreased in number in recent years. In 1936 there were some 11,400 periodicals coming out weekly or less frequently, over half of them bonded for inclusion of political material. In 1939 some 7,700 remained, two-thirds being bonded. These figures do not include government publications, which, however, are more in evidence outside of Japan than within. The magazines parallel in variety those found in America, ranging from pulp and movie magazines to the cultural and literary magazines such as Kaizo. Typically they were much larger than our magazines, some containing as many as 600 pages, but it is probable that they have undergone drastic reduction in size as well as number since December 7. Details on the pre-war circulation of Japanese magazines are found in Appendix B.

In rural regions the Ie no Hikari, a fiction and agricultural information magazine of the Farmers' Cooperative, is considerably more widely distributed than are newspapers. In the cities, women's magazines and movie magazines were among those widely read.

Children's literature, prepared under the supervision of the Department of Education, is important. Magazines, picture books, comic books, all carefully graded for various age-groups, are issued in large numbers. Frequently they present Japan's international or home policy through the medium of animal allegories.

2. Radio.

a. Equipment. The Japanese government provides only medium-wave programs for its domestic audience. There are today 47 medium-wave transmitters in Japan, all joined in one Japanese Broadcasting Corporation network. Of these, only seven initiate programs, the remainder being low-powered relay stations designed to make the programs audible in all parts of the country on very weak receivers. The great bulk of the broadcasts originate in Tokyo and Osaka, with occasional local features coming from the five other studios. Only one program is available in most areas, and only two simultaneous programs in Tokyo. Exchange programs are occasionally arranged with Korea, Formosa, Manchuria, Hanking, Thailand, and possibly other regions of "Greater East Asia".

July 21, 1941
Records: OSS Supplying Executive Planning Group - 10000-1000

192

CONFIDENTIAL

73

In 1939 4,350,000 receiving sets were licensed, averaging about one for every 17 persons (compare this with an estimated radio for every 2 1/2 persons in the United States, 1 for 5 in Germany, 1 for 2,500 in India). The distribution throughout Japan is not uniform. Most urban families have a radio, but in rural regions there may be less than half a dozen in a whole village. All licensed sets held by the general public receive only medium-wave transmissions. Until recently no one was permitted a set capable of receiving any foreign broadcasts. Apparently that policy worked to some extent against Japan's own interests, and so the ban was lifted.

Short-wave broadcasting is extensively carried on, however, for the benefit of Japanese nationals abroad and in 20 languages for the "enlightenment" of other peoples; but at home short-wave receivers and listening are strictly forbidden. Short-wave receiving equipment if illegally possessed would have to be imported or home-built, and radio experimentation has always been under the closest supervision of the government. The short-wave audience is probably limited to the government monitors and high army and government officials, with the possible addition of a few intrepid newsmen and those big industrialists who in past years may have surreptitiously acquired short-wave receivers in order to protect their interests with an independent source of news.

For details on the important domestic stations and on the languages used in short-wave transmissions, see Appendix C.

b. Programs. All broadcasting in Japan is government controlled, through the Department of Communications. This control is strict and purposeful. While internal political competition, as well as advertising, are kept off the air, radio programs are carefully directed toward "fostering national unity."

If we may trust Japanese statistics, Japanese programs are much more didactic than our own, with almost a fourth of their time being devoted to "talks and courses," less than a tenth devoted to music, and less than a tenth to entertainment. As far as the variety of programs goes, the range is similar to that found in America -- everything from radio drama to children's programs and stock market quotations. Characteristic broadcasts are the morning gymnastic programs, which are used in Japanese schools everywhere.

July 21 - 1941
Kendall's OSS Summary of Japanese Propaganda - 1941

142

CONFIDENTIAL

Radio programs in Japan have reflected the same division of interest found in most forms of popular entertainment there. Classical Japanese music and drama have shared the stage with European and American music and occidental dramatic themes. Presumably, the Western style of entertainment has been drastically reduced, if not completely removed, by this time.

3. Films.

a. Japanese domestic production. Motion picture production was started in Japan before 1900. Almost from the start domestic production which may be judged to have commanded about eighty per cent of the Japanese market in recent years, has dominated the field although foreign imports have been important too, at least until 1940. In 1937, the year of her greatest production, Japan produced some 2500 different films -- a larger total than Hollywood's. Of these 580 were feature films and over 1000 were newsreels. Since then production has declined rapidly. Almost all the Japanese films are "quickies," taking three weeks to a month to produce and costing around \$6,000 each. Few expensive "props" are used, technique is poor except for the photography of natural scenery, and editing is superficial. As of 1938, 70 per cent of the films were "talkies", with only 4 per cent completely lacking in sound accompaniment.

Production is dominated by two large combines, each of which is made up of a variety of originally independent companies. These combines are Shochiku, producing around 85 per cent of Japanese films, and Toho, producing some 14 per cent.

b. Theaters and audience. In 1938 motion picture theaters numbered 1,875 and had an audience capacity of 1,300,000, including standing room. Ninety per cent of the theaters has sound equipment, and 73 per cent showed Japanese films exclusively. For 1938 an average of 4.8 visits per person was reported. (Corresponding figures are 6 for Germany, 8 for France, and 31 for the United States.)

Until 1933, attendance at legitimate theater productions remained larger than motion picture attendance. In rural regions movie attendance is much less frequent than in cities, and usually only Japanese films are shown. Small villages rarely have theaters, but films are shown out-of-doors or in some available building two or three times a summer.

CONFIDENTIAL

75

c. Characteristics of Japanese films.

Influenced by the norms of the traditional theater, Japanese movie programs, by our standards, have always been very long, characteristically lasting 4½ to 5 hours, with an intermission. Double-features are usual, and triple-features are to be found in rural areas.

Japanese feature films are of two distinct types, the Kabuki or Samurai thriller and the modern type film which follows the American movie in dramatic form and theme.

(1) The Samurai thrillers made up over half the domestic feature production in 1939. They carry over the formalized acting characteristic of Japanese stage plays and frequently deal with the heroic and bloody adventures of the Samurai, the knights of old Japan. Themes of feuds and vengeance are prominent. They resemble our "wild west" films in their audience appeal. Other themes deal with traditional Japanese virtues, a typical one being the conflict between a man's duty to a superior and his love for his wife, duty winning out to provide the requisite "happy ending".

(2) The modern type films follow the pattern of American and European movies. They range from problem triangles to musical comedies. A characteristic Japanese emphasis in this sort of film is upon long and tearful melodramas.

Modern in realism and form of presentation are the ever increasing number of nationalistic and patriotic films. These glorify Japanese history, her military might, her "mission" in China, Manchuria, and the South Pacific, and, like the Kabuki, they stress the sterner aspects of Japanese character.

(3) Educational and cultural films were put into a position of prominence by a 1939 edict that all programs must include one film of this variety. Such films are made by various governmental agencies, notably the Department of Education, by the newspapers, by the universities or cultural associations, by advertisers, and by the regular motion picture companies. To be used in this program the film must be approved by the Department of Education. That the quality of these films is not high appears to be indicated by the report that of the 107 films offered

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CONFIDENTIAL

76

to the Ministry of Education during the first month of the operation of the new law, only 53 were accepted, most rejections being because of quality rather than type of content. Films, usually 16 mm., are used fairly extensively in the schools.

(4) Newsreels have increased rapidly in importance during the past seven years and are now reported to make up about half the total film production (exact figures are not available). The primary factor in their growth seems to have been government and public interest in the "China Incident". Doubtless the present extension of the war has provided a new spur to their further increase.

(5) Children's films consist mainly of a sort of newsreel, and of animated cartoons. Even in these the most common theme is Japanese military strength and the heroism of her soldiers, but some of them are concerned with animals, children's games, exceptional children, and various phases of adult industry and life.

d. Government control. Prior to 1939, the standard method of government control over films was the censorship exercised by the Department of Home Affairs and by the local police. This censorship followed the usual pattern of banning things disrespectful toward the emperor or monarchy in general, things likely to stir up discontent, themes incompatible with Japan's foreign policy, and things harmful to public morals. With the new motion picture law of April 4, 1939, not only were these negative controls intensified, but new positive aims of an educational and propagandistic nature appeared in the government controls. The law established a rigid centralized control over production, distribution, and exhibition to promote the "cultural advancement of the nation" -- i.e., regimentation along nationalistic lines. Now all scenarios must be approved by the Department of Home Affairs in advance of actual filming. All branches of the industry may operate only under special permits and all employees must be registered. As mentioned above, each program is to include one "educational" item -- and government-produced films of this nature must be shown if the government so orders. All films to be seen by minors, those under 14 years of age, must pass a special censorship by the Department of Education.

CONFIDENTIAL

77

Under its censorship regulations the government has long controlled the kinds of foreign films imported, and since late 1937 there have also been quantitative limitations on such importation. These restrictions were made more definite by a 1939 law under which a quota of about 100 films, of which 80 were to have been American, was set for 1940. This quota was about one-third of previous importation, and in practice importers were not allowed to bring in even this number. By 1941, even before the outbreak of hostilities, the importation of American films had almost stopped.

Other signs of government leadership are seen in the practice of preparing educational shorts in the government bureaus and in the subsidizing of specific patriotic features. As early as 1936 the government took the lead in establishing the Japan Motion Picture Association, which included the private companies and the interested government agencies.

6. Export of Japanese films. Japanese film exports, although encouraged by the government, have never been large and have been almost exclusively for the use of Japanese abroad. They have never been successful with non-Japanese audiences.^{1/} The Japanese in Manchuria constitute the biggest export market. Hawaii and the Pacific Coast of the United States also imported sizeable quantities.

7. The role of foreign films in Japan.

Most indices place the pre-war role of foreign films in the Japanese market at 20 per cent or a little above; and in the large urban areas, among the upper classes and university students, foreign features may at one time have taken up as much as 40 per cent of the movie-going time. American films made up 80 per cent of imports, with German and French films next in importance.

Foreign films were usually presented with their original sound accompaniment and super-imposed Japanese titles. Experiments at dubbing in a Japanese sound track were not successful with the audiences. That foreign films thus limited could compete as well as they did with the Japanese product is a strong testimonial to their general superiority.

^{1/} However, Japanese-controlled Chinese language pictures are being produced in Manchuria and Northern China.

CONFIDENTIAL

78

For the last twenty years or more, imported films have been subjected to a dual censorship -- by the customs office and by the Home Ministry. The censorship regulations are essentially the same as for domestic pictures, although more films are banned for political and social reasons than on purely moral grounds.

The 636 features imported in 1936 and 1937 were distributed by country of origin as follows:

<u>Country of Origin</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>
United States	512	80
France	42	7
Germany	39	6
Great Britain	27	4
Austria	5	1
Italy	3	
Czechoslovakia	3	
Soviet Russia	2	2
Hungary	2	
Switzerland	1	

In the 1939 law or in previous enactments there is no preference given to Japan's political partners, and as far as features are concerned, Italy and Germany do not seem to have increased their exports to Japan following the first anti-Comintern pact. The situation may have been different for other types of films, for Germany reports sending 37 educational films to Japan in 1936. In recent years there have been attempts to establish large-scale contracts for the exhibition of both Italian and German films -- the latter being represented by the Manchurian film monopoly which distributes a large number of German films. Japanese distributors had rejected these proposals up to the end of 1939, primarily because they were not to be allowed to select the pictures which they were to use. Likewise, German and Italian films were included in the general restriction against foreign films, although currently they doubtless constitute the bulk of whatever new foreign films are imported.

The tastes of the Japanese audience for American films apparently covers the range of allowed importations. Animated cartoons, musicals, and comedies have been especially popular; but at the

CONFIDENTIAL

79

same time the Japanese understand some of our sentimental tragedies well enough to weep at them. Many of our "problem movies", however, are not well understood. Recent restrictions have drastically curtailed showings of the first three types above, which have frequently been censored as frivolous. This has left as popular favorites American aviation films, those dealing with other forms of military activity, biographies of famous persons, historical films, and films of great adventure. "The Adventures of Marco Polo" was one of the most popular films of recent years.

The influence of American films on Japanese ideas has been great. Our movies created some impressions which fitted in with the stereotypes which Japanese domestic propaganda desired to instill -- that Americans are soft-livers, frivolous, rich, immoral, and excessively sentimental. On the other hand, they instilled much admiration for our material wealth and technology, and perhaps for our excellent film technique. United States and European films provided models for the young Japanese who, between the first world war and the Manchuria or Chinese episodes, desired to become modern, emancipated, Westernized.

Because the original sound-tracks were played, the talking picture was one of the most important instruments through which the English language and Western music were brought to the Japanese. From then the ordinary listener could pick up the most common English words and the student of English could acquire the much desired latest slang. In this and other ways English or bastard-English words crept into the Japanese language, words which the government is now trying to eliminate. Music has been influenced, too, in subtler ways, less easy to track down and exterminate. American music was popular, and a special form of Japanese Jazz has grown up as a result.

Today Japan turns her back on her brief flirtation with the Jazz age -- but some of the influences still remain.

741 - 1 and Knolls: DSS Supporting Economic Planning - 1950s-1960s

CONFIDENTIAL

80

C. Special Propaganda Devices

1. Semi-Private Organizations.

a. For Export Propaganda. Propaganda organizations or "fronts" of various kinds are numerous. Among the many organizations distributing Japanese publicity in English have been the Japan Publicity Agency, the Foreign Affairs Association of Japan (putting out the Japan Yearbook and Con-temporary Japan), and the Central Federation of Nippon Culture (publishing the rather scholarly Cultural Nippon). One of the most pretentious of the propaganda agencies directed abroad has been the Society for International Cultural Relations set up after Japan left the League of Nations.

There are also important organizations for propaganda to the satellite countries, most of them "international" bodies seeking cooperation on religion, economics, culture, etc.

b. For Domestic Propaganda. In the recent past, many patriotic organizations functioned more or less independently in the common task of drumming up ardent patriotism at home, but they have today dissolved or been merged with the Koa Domei, the Greater Asia Federation. The Koa Domei in turn is very closely linked to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the sole political party of Japan, which was created during the Konoye regime to replace all other parties.

The IRAA has expanded tremendously during the spring and summer months of this year (1942), becoming as all-pervasive in its influence as are the Nazi or Fascist parties. One of its branches is the Imperial Japan Youth Association, apparently supplanting previous patriotic youth groups. August announcements describe still more important extensions. IRAA branches are to be set up for each ward, block, and neighborhood, so that the "movement" will penetrate among the people." Moreover, in the future the IRAA and the prefectural administration are to be closely bound together, with the prefectural

CONFIDENTIAL

81

officers holding positions in the local IRAA at the same time. A new magazine is to be published, Yokusei (Political Assistance). Apparently, as in all one-party countries, the party is taking over governmental functions. Probably the IRAA machinery is, or will soon be, the most important channel of propaganda in Japan.^{1/}

All women's societies have been fused into the Greater Japan Women's Association, and an attempt made to extend membership, especially among the lower classes.

Numerous minor organizations contribute to domestic propaganda -- for example, the Japan-Germany-Italy Society, the Anti-Espionage League, the Anti-Christian Society, the Tokyo Air Defense Association, the Shintoism Association.

2. Imperial Rescripts. One Japanese propaganda device, perhaps more potent than any other existing in the world today, is the issuance of formal statements directly from the Emperor himself to the people. Such statements are called Imperial Rescripts and have been used with great discretion. They contain not only orders or appeals from the throne, but often substantiating arguments couched, however, in the most general terms. The rescript on education, laying down the basic policy of education in Japan, is a good example.^{2/} One rescript declared war on the United States. Rescripts were also issued on the occasion of Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933 and on her joining the Axis in 1940.

3. Holidays, Commemorative Songs, Slogans. Holidays, songs and slogans play an important role in Japanese domestic propaganda. The backlog of traditional holidays is well stocked with occasions emphasizing the glory of nation and Emperor, and new patriotic holidays are added to the calendar,

^{1/} Note that our information on these recent developments is derived from Japanese broadcasts.

^{2/} Quoted in full in section II.A.4. Aims in Education, above.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

such as the monthly Pearl Harbor Day. (See the list in Appendix A.) Victories are given government-organized celebrations, in which crowds gather and cheer, bands play, and speeches are made.

The Japanese also make much of songs and organizational anthems, many of which are selected in public competitions, sometimes sponsored by newspapers. Such songs are made the basis for movie shorts. Typical titles dating from 1938 and 1959 are: "Pacific Ocean March" (the new song of the navy), "Soldiers' Song," "Rising Sun Flag March," and "Continent March."

Slogans in and of themselves, are reported to wield exceptional power in Japan. They are usually initiated by high government officials. Examples will be found in the summary of propaganda content below (section 4).

D. General Nature of Domestic Propaganda

1. History of "Thought Control". Attempts by the Japanese Government to control actions by controlling thoughts date from before the Seventeenth Century and semi-totalitarian propaganda of a modern sort has existed since the beginning of the Meiji restoration (1868). A major manifestation of this policy is the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1891.^{1/} According to a Japanese spokesman in 1937, the feudal rule was, "The people should be kept in ignorance and led to trust the government;" whereas the modern rule, initiated with the Meiji regime, is "The people should be enlightened and led to trust the government." Thus there has been an advance from an older negative thought control to modern positive indoctrination.

Propaganda policy has changed from time to time, but a nationalistic emphasis has always been predominant although official encouragement of the introduction of selected Western ways has in

1 Reproduced in section II.A.4 above.

CONFIDENTIAL

83

the past made the government guidance and control which was operating less obvious. The onset of the Manchurian affair, of the Chinese "incident", of the war in Europe, of the Tri-partite pact, and of Japan's recent entry in the war have all led to further tightening of the government's "thought control" and more marked rejection of the Western influences formerly encouraged.

The nature of the negative, or censorship, controls has been indicated above. In addition to these there have been the obvious extensions of control over public assemblies, organizations, teaching of all kinds, religious activities, and the like. Most remarkable of these general controls is the ban on "dangerous thoughts", i.e., thoughts at variance with official ideology. This is enforced not only by eavesdropping on conversations, but also occasionally by interviewers who frankly ask one's opinion on controversial issues.

2. Organizational Complexity. The many references to official and unofficial agencies and methods of controlling and channeling the information which reaches the Japanese people in the discussions of Education, Mass Communications, and Special Propaganda Devices indicate clearly how complex and sprawling is the Japanese propaganda organization. While current changes are decidedly in the direction of centralized and unified control, it is unlikely that this will be achieved, except superficially, to the extent that it has been in Germany or the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, there has been considerable unity of purpose in the operations of the governmental, semi-private, and private agencies. This has been true because of the exceptional power of the government to regulate the private agencies and because of like-mindedness on such essentials as super-patriotism, Japanese superiority, and devotion to the divine Emperor, among the leaders of most of the influential groups which have wielded supreme state authority in varying combinations since the Meiji restoration.

CONFIDENTIAL

84

3. Major Aims. The major aims of domestic propaganda have been to instill in the Japanese a patriotic fervor and an acceptance of the social and economic status quo, including an unquestioning obedience to superiors, especially the divine Emperor.

Obedience which asks that life be given up and that poverty be endured must be justified. Justification of Japan's wars of conquest, especially the present one, is therefore of prime importance. This is done by describing Japan's defense against villainous enemies, by appealing to Japan's national glory and divine destiny, and by appealing to the glory of the Emperor. And, since might makes right and one does not fight indefinitely without hope, it is essential to convince the Japanese that victory is certain. The nature of these arguments is further elaborated in the content summary below.

4. Content Summary. The content summary of domestic propaganda presented below is based principally on recent and current FCC monitorings of short-wave radio programs in Japanese. This source has been utilized because it is the most comprehensive and up-to-date available and because other individually less complete sources of Japanese propaganda as disseminated by press, speeches, films, etc., indicate that the general lines followed are primarily the same as the radio lines.

FCC monitors a 24-hour program of short-wave broadcasts, which seems, from internal evidence, to be intended for an essentially domestic audience -- probably the soldiers and other Japanese in the South Pacific Region. It is believed by the FCC monitors that these may be short-wave rebroadcasts of the medium-wave programs prepared for the home population. Although this is not entirely certain, the propaganda lines revealed in these monitorings are the same as those of domestic propaganda as they are known through other more scattered and less comprehensive sources.

July 1, 1945
DSS
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Memorandum
142

85

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192

(3) Civilian Morale. The willingness of the Japanese to withstand the deprivations of war and their confidence in victory are frequently asserted. "The souls of the Japanese people are bright and strong, brimming with confidence in completing the war." "If the war should last for 1000 years, the vigor and enthusiasm of the Japanese will not wane..." At the same time, propaganda for other purposes seems occasionally to indicate imperfect civilian morale. A fifth column of rumor-spreaders has been exercised. Concern was expressed for the maintenance of order during the spring

CONFIDENTIAL

86

elections and over the panic caused by the Doolittle raids. There are also frequent warnings against over-confidence.

(4) Support from Asiatic Peoples.

While the allegation that Asiatic peoples support Japan is primarily presented in such a manner as to justify Japan's role in the war (see below), it also supports the picture of Japanese invincibility. Participation in actual fighting by the Nanking government and by Thailand and native cooperation in the conquest of the East Indies, Malaya, and Burma were frequently asserted.

(5) Axis Strength and Victories.

This has never been a major argument on Japanese radio broadcasts, although it is regularly present. Straight German versions of the news are used, even for the Russian front. Attention is also given to Tri-partite solidarity, usually through reports of diplomatic and cultural exchanges.

(6) United Nations Weaknesses and

Defeats. The treatment of United Nations' military weakness appears mainly in connection with the Pacific area. The chief picture is of a United States and Britain lacking important material essentials, weak in morale, internally divided, and facing ruin. China is pictured as completely impotent except for annoyance value important to the degree to which she is supplied and provoked by the Anglo-Americans. China is alleged to feel resentful toward the democracies for abandoning her. Australia likewise feels abandoned to her fate. But while Japan still occasionally says, as she did in January, "Now the enemy has no strength left", this picture of weakness is frequently contradicted in the home broadcasts in order to prepare the people for a long war and further sacrifices. For this purpose, the Japanese themselves are told that "The enemy is strong", that "Britain and the United States are not weak nations; they are bad nations."

CONFIDENTIAL

87

b. Arguments to convince the Japanese People that the War is Necessary, Justified, and Desirable.

(1) The Defensive Nature of Japan's Fight and the Villainy of the enemy.

(a) United States Villainy.

Well before the attack on Pearl Harbor the United States had become the main target for Japanese propaganda. The Kurusu mission was never treated hopefully. The United States was, and is, portrayed as anti-Japanese, contemptuous, jealous, and fearful. Negroes are said to be treated like dogs in the United States, and Japanese are said to be classified with Negroes in American thinking. The United States seeks world domination.

(b) British Villainy. The

British are the unscrupulous exploiters of the Asiatic peoples. They have a history of "atrocious massacres, invasions, and piracies; a continuous panorama of aggression and looting." Britain and America are not only blamed for the recent extension of the war, but also for the initial Chinese incident, because they induced China to resist by false promises. They are also blamed for the fact that the China Incident is not closed, because of the material aid they sent to China. India features largely in the portrait of Anglo-Saxon villainy.

(c) Chinese Villainy. Villainy

is attributed to only a portion of the Chinese populace -- namely, to "communists", "terrorists", and the Chungking regime. To the first two groups are attributed all difficulties which arise in North China or the occupied regions. The Chungking regime is accused of selfishness, stubbornness, and "lack of sincerity". This is not only a bromide applied to all who fail to see eye-to-eye with Japan, but also an important accusation believed by many Japanese who hold sincerity of purpose high in the scale of values, despite its frequent observance in the breach. While the policy has been at times (most

CONFIDENTIAL

88

recently, just prior to Pearl Harbor) to seek peace with the Chungking regime, the current policy is "to destroy the Chungking government regardless of cost", said to be nearing accomplishment. The fifth anniversary of the initiation of "the incident" was celebrated on July 6th, at which time Chinese casualties were given at five million. The Japanese people are told, however, that most of China favors the Greater-East-Asia-Co-Prosperity Sphere, and that Japan will forgive her as one forgives a spoiled child.

(d) Russia. Japanese propaganda with respect to Russia during the recent months can be summarized as, "Russia is going to remain neutral, but Japan is well prepared against her." Anti-Russian sentiments crop out in the pro-Hitler reporting of the Russo-German front, in the anti-Russian news from Iran, and in general anti-communist propaganda. The difficulties which Japan faces in trying to maintain neutrality are stressed. Many of these are attributed to the machinations of China, Britain, and the United States. Occasionally more belligerent anti-Russian sentiments appear. The anniversary of the defeat of the Russians at Mukden in the Russo-Japanese War was celebrated unrestrainedly. In the first part of February Russia was listed as one of Japan's three fronts. From time to time the Japanese citizen is assured that the defenses of the "North area" are strong enough for any eventuality.

(2) The Altruistic Nature of Japan's War Aims and Actions, and the Resulting Affection Accorded her by the Various Asiatic Countries.

(a) Altruistic Japanese War Aims. Japan's name for the war is "War of Greater East Asia", and it is said to be fought for the establishment of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", under which the various peoples, closely related racially and culturally, will join each other in self-determination and cooperation. Of course, some nation must lead, and Japan assumes that it is "her mission and responsibility to be the stabilizing

CONFIDENTIAL

89

force in East Asia." To set up this new world, Japan has to achieve the complete expulsion of Anglo-American interests from the Orient. She means to go farther and "put an end to Britain and America", "destroy the cultures created by such evil people", "march into London and Washington." The war is also said to be fought for the glory of the Emperor and for Japanese world hegemony.

(b) References to the Japanese Satellites. Japan's broadcasts in Japanese speak mainly of Japanese good works in the occupied countries. They tell of schools re-opened, railways and factories repaired, museums established, students (from Thailand and Burma) arriving to study in Japan, administrations turned over to the natives (in Burma, China, the Philippines), natives trained along with Japanese for the administration of the "southern lands". However, a picture of Japanese imperialism is from time to time allowed to shine through the altruistic window-dressing.

While the main picture is of grateful natives deferring to their Japanese liberators, yet fairly frequent items on Japanese programs reveal that all does not go too smoothly in Japanese relations with native populations. Antagonism is explained, however, by admitting defeat in the propaganda war: The Philippines are "misled by United States Broadcasts;" Takada of the International Information Bureau admits that "we have been defeated by white people" in the "Thought war".

c. Appeals to the Glory of Japan and the Emperor, and to Japan's Manifest Destiny as World Ruler.

(1) The Myth of Japanese History. Japanese propaganda strongly reinforces the nationalistic myths of origin from the favored people of the Sun Goddess, and of superior racial and moral qualities. Moreover, in an obviously compensatory way recent Japanese propaganda stresses Japan's contribution to other cultures, often going to absurd lengths.

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142

90

7th July 2016
Rt Hon David Jones MP
Secretary of State
Department of Health
10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA

(3) Precedents for World Rule. The Japanese government has for some years past deliberately preached Japanese world rule to the Japanese people. This theme is exemplified in the so-called Shinto Bible, The Way of the Subjects, issued by the Department of Education in 1941; in the pamphlets expounding Japanese nationalism, translated as "What is Nippon Kokutai" in 1936; in current radio lectures by Japanese academicians; and in the repudiated "Tanaka Memorial" of 1927. Outside of the simple assertion that Japanese world hegemony is one of Japan's ideals, the prospect has two main justifications.

The most important seems to be the historical commands and exhortations of the Japanese ancients. Most of these precedents have received public currency only recently. The greatest of them is the proclamation of the Emperor Jimmu, legendary founder of Japan: "Therefore let the capital be extended so as to embrace the six cardinal points and let the eight corners of the world be covered so as to form a roof. Will this not be good?" This is the basis of the "Hakko Ichiu" (eight corners) policy, which seek "universal brotherhood" under the Japanese Emperor. The present Emperor, in a pre-war statement, has reiterated this command.

Japanese moral superiority is the other main justification for world rule. Japanese culture and way of life is so superior to that of all other peoples that not only is she justified in extending her rule, but it becomes her "moral obligation" to do so. "Nippon is, needless to say, the model state for all mankind ... the fundamental organ for unity ..."

1971, the meeting, planned to focus on the raising of arms and etc. for the summer. Held as usual in the temporary theatre in the woods, but in the basement when one of our boys came later with the same alias. In addition, city women and men were encouraged to

CONFIDENTIAL

91

(4) The Extent of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The extent of the area involved in Japan's immediate program has tended to expand as the war progressed, although very ambitious projects have been outlined for some years in advance of the actual outbreak of hostilities. Pre-war claims included all areas conquered up to the present, and also India, Turkey, Arabia, Australia, and Hawaii. Some extreme recent claims include all of Europe and America, as parts of Asia.

d. The Pattern of Behavior and the Attitudes Asked of the Japanese People.

(1) The Virtues of the Good Citizen.

One of the primary aims of the indoctrination process is the production of patriotic citizens. The good Japanese citizen is obedient, satisfied with his position, patriotic, loyal, self-controlled, pious, dutiful to his parents, and filled with the "Yamato spirit". Under wartime conditions the good citizen has unity and faith, is willing to make any sacrifice, leads a "simple wartime life".

For the soldier this pattern of virtues is intensified. Unquestioning obedience, loyalty, duty become paramount. Unity of mind, courage, valor, piety, politeness, comradeship, humility, simplicity, frugality, integrity, purity, and the avoidance of self-indulgence and negligence are desired (see section III. B. 2. b., Bushido). These are to be enforced by developing a sensitivity to shame and disgrace. The soldier must develop the spirit of self-sacrifice and come to feel that death in battle is the highest end. To be taken prisoner is shameful. To support the soldier in these values, much ritual has been established -- the yearly enshrining of the souls of departed soldiers at Yasukuni, the heroization of the "three human bombs", and other instances of self-sacrifice.

For the woman, virtue is found in the raising of sons who die for the Emperor. Held as ideal is the legendary woman who apologized to the Emperor when one of her sons came back from the wars alive. In addition, city women are now being encouraged to

192

CONFIDENTIAL

92

volunteer for agricultural labor.

From the youth of Japan farm labor is now demanded. There is also an ever expanding "Young Men's Volunteer Corps" to work in Manchuria.

Small business men and civil servants in Japan are undergoing drastic relocations, as domestic government and business are pared to provide personnel for colonial administration. These relocations receive mention, though little in the way of sympathy in Japanese radio broadcasts.

(2) Sinful Attitudes to be Avoided and Driven Out. Currently the attitudes portrayed as most undesirable and most un-Japanese are the cluster of liberalism, individualism, democracy, and Westernization. Persons with these ideas "sell out their nation, not only themselves and their families, because of their wrong concept of White worship." Communism continues to be a bug-a-boo, but its influence in Japan is not much stressed.

(3) The Extent of Sacrifices Necessary. The Japanese are consistently told that the war will be a long one. Warnings or expressions of determination give figures varying between 10 and 1,000 years, with the figure 100 being possibly most frequent. The Japanese audience is further prepared for continued sacrifice through emphasis upon the strength of the enemy. The Japanese are encouraged to collect all scrap metals, to buy war bonds, and they are told that fuel and food shortages will continue despite the conquest of raw materials. Drastic readjustments in the economic life are demanded, such as the reduction by one-half of the cultivation of silk and the drastic reduction of the number of small merchants.

E. Japanese Export Propaganda

The Japanese broadcast to Europe in English, Italian, German, French, and Japanese; to the Americas in English, Spanish, Portuguese, Chinese, and Japanese;

142

1. 1st Rank: OSS Supervisor Formal Planning Group

192

1. Unit 8: OSS Support Planning Process

Radio is, of course, only one of the many methods of foreign propaganda used by Japan. Over the years a great deal has been accomplished through encouraging influential persons and students to visit Japan. Many sympathizers in Burma, India, Thailand, China, Annam, and other countries have been nourished in this way. Subsidized newspapers have long been used in China, and probably elsewhere. During the

July - L. and R. Roads: Oss Septem from the Phosphor - least loss

102

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Japan. Anti-Semitic books appeared as early as 1939 (e.g., "The Jewish against Japan" by T. Muto), and societies were soon organized to further the program (e.g., the "Anti-Espionage League" and the "Anti-Christian Society", the latter claiming Christianity to be a demoralizing device of Jewish origin). The newspaper Hochi Shinbun has spread this theme as well as other Nazi doctrines, and German produced films on the subject have been distributed. German influence on Japanese propaganda methods is probably limited to the treatment of news for military purposes. The Japanese could probably teach the Germans some lessons in the effective indoctrination of the home population. Observers have noted that Japanese exploitation of world events has become more coordinated with the German line since the first months of Japan's participation in the war.

2. United States and England. The cultural influence of the United States and, especially at an earlier period, England, was the greatest of any two countries upon Japan; but the media available to them for current propagandizing are very limited. Britain is sending very little propaganda to Japan. Australia broadcasts in Japanese to Japan and to the Japanese soldiers away from home. For America we have fragmentary knowledge of shortwave radio programs to Japan prepared by O.W.I. These probably reach only the government radio monitors, a few high officials, and a few colonial Japanese permitted short-wave receiving equipment. The principal content of such broadcasts (sent from KGEI and KWID in San Francisco) is the American and United Nations version of the news. This stresses Allied strength and victories, Japanese and Axis losses, Japanese and Axis immorality in warfare, etc. In addition to the straight news, talks and feature programs are included. These have spent a great deal of their time attempting to make the Japanese distrust the intentions of the Nazis. They have likewise attacked the Japanese military clique and the ethics of the Japanese soldiers in China.

3. China. Some Chinese propaganda doubtless gets into Japan, although its amount or efficacy are unknown. Chungking sends out by short-wave Japanese broadcasts which somewhat unrealistically tell of the inevitable Japanese defeat. Through Korean sympathizers, the Chinese maintain some operatives within Japan, but whether these do other than intelligence work is not known.

4. Russia. Apparently the truce between Japan and Russia has not been extended to the area of propaganda warfare, for each continues to broadcast in the other's language from transmitters audible in the other's country. It is possible that Russia sends medium and long wave transmissions to Japan in addition to short-wave. We have little knowledge of the content of such broadcasts. Samples of short-wave broadcasts from Eastern Siberia in English and Russian show them to deal almost exclusively with the European war theater, stressing Nazi losses and immorality and Russian strength.

III. NATIONALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY ORIENTED SOCIAL ATTITUDES

A. Historic Basis of Modern Attitudes

The attitudinal patterns of modern Japan derive from the inter-play of traditional Japanese and modern Western culture.^{1/} Essentially, the internal history of Japan from the Tokugawa Era to the present is one of modification of the old Japanese culture in terms of Western technology and, to a lesser extent, Western value systems; while the external history is a history of the Japanese effort to become great among nations and have this greatness recognized by the West. As a preliminary to the consideration of contemporary Japanese attitudes, therefore, it is necessary to describe briefly certain characteristics of Tokugawa Japan and of the way in which Western culture has impinged upon Japan during the last three-quarters of a century.

1. The Tokugawa Period.

a. Isolation. The Tokugawa period in Japanese history (1615-1868) began when the Tokugawa family succeeded in conquering rival claimants to power, thus ending a long series of civil wars. It was a period of national consolidation along feudal lines and was characterized from the outset by the virtually complete withdrawal of Japan from intercourse with the outside world. Foreigners were expelled, Christianity, which had gained some followers in Kyushu, was ruthlessly suppressed, the building of seaworthy ships, and the emigration of Japanese, on pain of death should they attempt to return home, were forbidden. This policy of isolation was maintained until Perry's visit in 1853. It is an important period in Japanese history, both for allowing internal cultural consolidation and for providing the centuries-old historical basis for contemporary Japanese dislike of foreigners.

^{1/} The culture here called "Japanese" has been, of course, profoundly influenced by Chinese culture.

b. Government. Under the Tokugawa Shoguns a military government was carried on in times of peace, its main purpose being to preserve a feudal and military society, rigid and unchanging. While the Emperor as nominal head of the state maintained a court at Kyoto, the Shoguns directed the actual government from Tokyo (then called Yedo). The country was divided into feudal fiefs each with its own lord or daimyo having absolute power in his own province, including the right to impose taxes. To prevent rebellion, the Shogun required each feudal lord to spend a part of the year in Tokyo and, while in his province, to leave his wife and children at the capital as hostages. The mass of the people were farmers owing taxes to the feudal lords of the respective districts and controlled by military men (samurai) who owed allegiance to these same lords.

Officers of the central government often had ill-defined functions. High offices were duplicated or their functions discharged by councils rather than by individuals. The elders or councilors in the government rotated in key positions. This system extended right down to the small local kumi, (groups of five persons) which formed the units of rural organization. Thus, shifting of responsibility from man to man and its concentration in groups rather than in individuals were characteristic. Similar features of divided and rotated responsibility are found today in both national and local government. To enable the central government to deal quickly and effectively with incipient political dissent, spies were employed to report on dangerous conditions as they might develop in the various provinces.

The government was run partly on Confucian principles, with many of its laws ethical in nature; economic and other problems of government were dealt with in ethical rather than practical terms, with the object of preserving unchanged the system of classes (enumerated above in Section I.E.1. Traditional Classes). Loyalty to one's superiors and filial piety were always stressed as primary virtues. Farmers were urged to be industrious, samurai to be economical. Mystic ethical principles still find an important place in Japanese government.

Laws were broad and were frequently not comprehended by the people. Different classes were differently punished. "It is good Confucian doctrine that the common people should do what they are told, without asking why; and certainly no Japanese ruler went out of his way to explain his commands to his humblest subjects."^{1/} Today a similar tendency is noticeable in the law, and police may and do imprison people for days without making any formal charges if they think detention is in the national interest.

c. Rise of Commercialism. During the Tokugawa regime, despite all obstacles, the merchant class gradually expanded and increased its internal travel and trade. Rice, the traditional form of exchange, became too bulky for commercial transactions early in the period and money gradually came into general use among the merchant classes. Samurai continued to receive income in rice, and even up to the Meiji revolution considered money vulgar and beneath a gentleman's notice. As time passed the merchant class became more and more influential. Many took to rice brokerage and speculation, and the consequent sharp fluctuations in the price of rice imposed great hardships on both the farmers and samurai whose incomes depended upon it. Even the feudal lords, including the Tokugawa, felt these economic jolts. The government in reaction tried to control rice prices, but without avail. Many agrarian revolts occurred due to extremes of poverty, which were frequently the result of increased taxation by impoverished samurai and feudal lords. These were often cruelly crushed. Tenant-owner disputes continued throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, and in some parts of Japan they have recurred in quite recent years.

The merchants, living in growing commercial cities, had plenty of money, and were the main patrons of the theater and the arts as well as of the "dream world" of bath girls and courtesans. Whenever the national exuberance and love of the frivolous and obscene became too marked, the government would issue repressive laws, but, in spite of all, the gay city recreations continued to increase

^{1/} G. B. Sanson, Japan: A Short Cultural History (New York, 1931) p. 451.

CONFIDENTIAL

100

in quantity and variety. The government is today again worrying itself about the "morals" of its people by closing dance halls and prohibiting all kinds of sentimental songs.

During the Tokugawa period, a little freedom of research was permitted at home. Native scholars gradually spread the idea that the Emperor was the true head of the government and that the shoguns were usurpers of power. Native Shinto ideas were stressed at the expense of Buddhism -- an imported religion.

When the West knocked forcibly at Japan's closed doors in 1853, one more strain was added to a feudal system already weakened by the growth of mercantilism and the increasing conviction of educated men that the feudal lords were usurpers of the Emperor's divine power. The Tokugawa government was forced to resign in 1867-68 by a group of "outside lords" who got control of the Emperor and ousted the Shoguns. Feudalism was abolished and the monarchy "restored."

2. The Meiji Restoration and After. Xenophobia was utilized by the Shogun's opponents, and their revolution in its political phase was carried out under the slogan, "Expel the foreigner and restore the Emperor." The Emperor was moved to Yedo (Tokyo, renamed "Eastern Capital", to symbolize the change from the Shogun's Yedo), and a new central government established in which the Emperor was made to appear the actual ruler, but in which his power was actually very limited, real authority being vested in the leaders of the military and rising commercial and industrial groups.

Following the quick defeat of the Shogun's forces, the groups in control of Japan dropped their blatant xenophobia and deliberately set about reorganizing the country by introducing carefully selected Western ideas and techniques. At the same time, they elaborated and emphasized certain elements of Japanese culture in such a way as to universalize ideas previously held by a small minority. In a word, they imported the technical aspects of the Western industrial revolution, but sought to exclude the individualistic-democratic-equalitarian ideology which had

141/21
1
61
Records: OSS
Supervising
Executive Planning
Group - 100000
10/15

142

101

July 1st Monday: OSS Supporting Economic Development: Review of the

It must not be thought, of course, that the new ruling groups of 1868 planned all subsequent developments and that their successors then stuck rigidly to the plan. On the contrary, the ruling groups shifted; the country's policy was greatly influenced by the Western ideology which necessarily crept in through Japanese who studied abroad and those who studied Western texts at home; the snow-balling industrial revolution swept the country along with it. With all variations, the essence of Japan's evolution from the time of the restoration to the present is nevertheless best summarized as a blending of Western technique and Japanese ideology, and to this extent, at least, there is a consistent pattern.

Because Japan promulgated a constitution, established universal compulsory primary education, eliminated many class distinctions, democratized its army by introducing conscription and destroying samurai privileges, it appeared to many in the West that the country was being thoroughly reconstituted along liberal-democratic lines. What was not observed was that instead of establishing representative government the constitution made possible clique rule with the military in a key position; 1/ that compulsory primary education was the perfect method of inculcating universally the ideology desired by the central government; that the elimination of some class distinctions was a potential contribution to disciplined national solidarity and did not necessarily involve equal rights; that the "democratization" of the army made accessible to the masses the traditionally high honor of military service, previously restricted to the samurai, and thus laid the groundwork for what we now call "total war."

The maintenance of a fundamentally Japanese value system underlying the technically Westernized face of the nation was not accomplished without a

1/ See above Sections I.F.1 Tokyo Group Rule, and
I.F.2.a. The Emperor and His Advisors.

struggle. More than once, it appeared that Western liberalism might prevail. In the 1870's, some few intellectuals argued for the adoption of a more liberal constitution, based primarily on the ideals of the French revolution rather than on the Prussian model actually followed. Later, in the early years of the twentieth century, many professors at Tokyo Imperial University accepted and disseminated the ideas of Anglo-Saxon liberalism, but the trend was checked in 1911 when the police arrested twelve radical socialists as anarchists and executed them for allegedly having plotted to blow up the Emperor's train.

The most important upsurge of Western liberalism occurred during and after the World War, especially in the twenties, when a labor movement of considerable importance developed, manhood suffrage was granted, political parties became significant forces in the government, funds for military purposes were reduced, courageous women such as Baroness Shidzue Ishimoto agitated for women's rights and urged the adoption of birth control techniques, Communist organizations multiplied and some of Marx's writings became popular. For a time it looked as though Japan might become ideologically as well as technologically Westernized. But if the twenties witnessed the high-water mark of liberalism in Japan, they also saw the rise of that tidal wave of anti-foreign military-imperialism which swept everything before it in the 1930's.

The beginnings of this most recent reaction can be traced to the months following the great Tokyo earthquake of 1923, when the need for active policing of the city because of the disruption of all normal services and activities gave the reactionaries a chance to turn police terror against labor organizers, alleged socialists, and other liberals. The study of politics was forbidden in the middle schools, and in the universities political ideas were made a matter of police control. In 1925, the Peace Preservation Law was passed, worded vaguely enough so as to allow the authorities to interpret almost any organized political move as subversive, and thus to suppress any unwanted political activities.^{1/} In 1928 there was a mass arrest of Communists and the movement was driven underground and abroad.

^{1/} See Sebald, William (Trans.), The Criminal Code of Japan, Kobe, 1936, pp. 259-260, for a translation of this law.

CONFIDENTIAL

103

Liberalism still persisted among some of the bureaucracy and younger business men, but in the struggle for internal power which preceded and accompanied the Manchurian adventure, the military-imperialists got virtually complete control of the central government, finally consolidating their power in the "new structure" of the national defense state which came into being following Japan's 1936 adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact and the beginning of the Chinese war in 1937. The last phases of reaction were carried on openly under military auspices (the "young officers"), and were accompanied by political assassinations at home and treaty-breaking aggression abroad.

In essence, the whole reaction was (and is) a powerful resurgence of xenophobia directed against liberal democratic ideology at home and against Western imperial interests abroad, and accompanied by a vigorous reassertion of Japanese superiority and extreme nationalism.

This, very briefly, is the background for present Japanese attitudes. The ideological movements roughly sketched above have been, and will continue to be, variously explained, but two factors may be stressed as having been of considerable importance in producing them.

First, the making over of Japan's economy was not by any means a painless operation. Grave social dislocations necessarily occurred in the change-over from feudal to industrial organization, and, as a result, many Japanese have felt more or less chronically insecure as industrialization progressed. This insecurity on a national scale has found expression in the violent rejection of Western values, and in a sort of nostalgic longing for the good old way of life. It is partly because of the widespread social uneasiness thus engendered that the perpetuation of old Japanese ideology has been possible. At times, as in the talk of a "Showa Restoration" (Showa -- "Enlightened Peace" -- is the official designation of Hirohito's reign), some Japanese have exhibited a revivalistic yearning to restore and consolidate the old values. This sort of reaction against Westernism has occurred in several non-Western peoples -- the Klamath Indians of North America, the Crokaiva of New Guinea, and

July 11 - 61 Records: OSS Supply Committee Planning - Wash DC

182

certain Bantu tribes of Africa. Japan, because she has acquired the military power of Western technique has been able effectively to implement the feeling in action, while these other peoples, lacking the machinery and arms, have been unable to do so. (The comparison is important not only as an aid in understanding Japan, but also because it helps us to understand one of the attitudes involved in the apparent cooperation of some Asiatic peoples with the Japanese. Propaganda alone could not have produced this result unless the basic attitude was present -- as among the Burmese -- for the propagandists to manipulate.)

A second important factor influencing the course of Japanese ideological changes has been the attitude displayed by Western nations and peoples toward Japan. In general, foreigners abroad have shown little respect for Japan as a nation and even less for the Japanese as a people. The lack of foreign recognition has been well-nigh intolerable to the Japanese, whose pride of race, nation, and culture has been repeatedly slighted by the Westerners. While the American Exclusion Act of 1924 was, perhaps, more exacerbating than any other single irritant, it is only one of many which have been deeply resented by the Japanese. Their plea for formal recognition of racial equality was rejected at Versailles; foreigners in Japan -- especially the self-assured British, with their unconcealed attitudes of superiority to all Asiatic peoples -- were sometimes extremely offensive; and Westerners in their own countries not only tended to ignore Japan's claim to status as a nation among nations but also to regard Japan as merely another Asiatic country and as such incapable of industrial efficiency, and distinctive only as being somewhat more aggressive than the others.

B. Japanese Nationalism

1. Glorification of Race and Culture. The outstanding attitude of the Japanese toward themselves and their nation is a strong belief in their uniqueness -- and superiority -- as compared to other peoples and nations. The myth of Yamato (Japanese) racial superiority is as old as Japanese

contact with other peoples, and found expression centuries ago in the phrase Yamato Damashii (the Japanese Spirit), which is conceived of as a spirit of enthusiasm and determination enabling Japanese to overcome all obstacles in seeking their objectives. While the Japanese would agree that other peoples may show tenacity in the face of difficulties, they would also hold that that determination must necessarily be inferior to the supreme determination of a Japanese, acquired by virtue of his birth as a member of the Yamato "race."

Today, most Japanese are completely convinced that theirs is a race superior to all others; that they are descended from the same gods, and therefore share to some extent in the same divinity as the Emperor; that Japan is the chosen country of the gods, and is unique in the world because it is under their exclusive protection; that Japanese culture is superior to any other, even in such spheres as industry or mechanized warfare, the technical basis for which came into Japan from Europe and America.

Intensive and systematic indoctrination, building on solid cultural traditions by means of universal primary education, adult education, and the many other propaganda methods described above, have implanted in every Japanese ever since the early days of the Meiji era faith in racial, national, and cultural superiority (backed by the religious sanctions of State Shinto). Because the modern Japanese authoritarian regime has behind it a cultural homogeneity developed during a period of over two hundred odd years of isolation under the Shogunate, and because the new supernationalist traditions and attitudes were in accord with the basic ethnocentrism of the preliterate mass of the (peasant) population and with the traditions of feudal loyalty of the samurai and Daimyo at the time of the Meiji restoration, the Japanese race myth, as well as other convictions associated with Japanese super-nationalism, is much more deeply rooted in the attitude complex of the Japanese than are similar beliefs in other countries.

By way of contrast, the highly diversified cultural traditions of Germany and Italy produced ideological bastions of resistance to the more recent Nazi and Fascist propaganda efforts, which have not yet been completely eliminated.

With national attitudes such as the above carefully insulated through "thought control" from possibly damaging contact with Western ideas, it is evident that Japan has had a tremendous advantage over other nations in planning for total war, since virtually the entire population is ready and willing to make any sacrifices for the nation.

2. Phases of Nationalism. Japanese nationalism is compounded out of several inter-related elements in addition to Yamato Damashii. Especially important among these elements are three "ways": (State Shinto, the way of the gods; Bushido, the way of the Bushi or samurai; and Kodo, the way of the Emperor. Like Yamato Damashii, all of these "ways" have origins which contemporary Japanese publicists trace back to pre-Meiji traditions, but unlike Yamato Damashii, the antique ideas involved have been carefully reorganized into the present concepts since 1868. Indeed, the term Bushido dates only from the restoration, while Kodo came into use even more recently.

a. State Shinto. The "way of the gods" is Emperor worship; its ceremonies are frequent throughout Japan, and it is taught in the schools. (See above Section I.G.I.d. State Shinto) Although stressing the divinity of the Emperor, State Shinto is not regarded as a religion by the Japanese, because their constitution assures freedom of "religion" and State Shinto is a compulsory belief. Actually, this religion of patriotism seems to have been morticed together out of older beliefs as a device calculated to insure the absolute symbolic (not actual) authority of the Emperor by making him a living god, backed by 26 centuries of "unbroken" divine lineage originating in the supreme dieties. By thus greatly augmenting the Emperor's symbolic significance, the groups controlling him assured themselves of a more thoroughgoing grip on the nation. At the same time the Emperor of Japan, like the King of England and the American Constitution, is a powerful symbol of national unity. As such he helps to create a loyalty to the nation to replace the older loyalty to local district and feudal lord.

With exceedingly few exceptions, no Japanese would openly deny the Emperor's divinity or defy his authority. In February 1936, when the "Young Officers" organized a revolt in an effort to force the

CONFIDENTIAL

107

government further in the direction of military-imperialism, assassinated several high government officials, and occupied several public buildings in Tokyo, they did so in the name of the Emperor, claiming that he was being misled by his advisors. This appeal not only illustrates the goal of Japanese politics, which is to control the Emperor, but also indicates the potency of his symbolic power, which alone is sufficient to carry the nation along with it. That the rebel officers refused for some hours to surrender, even after being commanded to do so by the Emperor, is important for two reasons. First, it, more than anything else, served to discredit them in the eyes of the people, who were horrified at such disobedience. Second, it is a demonstration that the myth of the Emperor's absolute, divine authority is not accepted outright by those high up in national politics -- although such people are usually not so inept as to get themselves into the position of defying the Emperor's will and thus losing all popular support. (Probably failure to obey the Emperor is the principal reason for the shooting, after court-martial, of the leaders of this revolt, since their aims were taken into account in governmental policy immediately afterwards, and they continued to be regarded by the higher army officers as having acted out of worthy patriotic motives.)

While it might appear from what has been said that State Shintoism is an unmitigated fake, which must be apparent to most of the Japanese people, nothing could be further from the truth. Many reject parts of the official rigamarole of faith, but belief in the divinity of the Emperor and in the unquestionable rightness of his official acts is a fundamental attitude of most Japanese, even including those high in the government who appear from the outside to be merely manipulating him.

b. Bushido. The "way of the samurai" is derived from the old feudal code, which laid especial stress on filial piety and on loyalty. Personal loyalty -- to duly constituted superiors -- is probably the greatest virtue an individual Japanese can possess.

The content of the loyalty concept for a Japanese is very broad. In Japan, loyalty means unquestioning obedience to the superordinate authority, whether

July 1945
1. General Remarks: OSS Summary Conference - 1945
1945

1945

CONFIDENTIAL

father, school teacher, policeman, or superior officer in army and navy, and ideally requires not only that the individual be willing to relinquish personal satisfactions if asked to do so by the authority, but that he exalt his loyalty over all personal considerations and regard learning and doing what is expected of him as his most important duty. While Japanese feudal loyalty was primarily loyalty to individuals as such, today it is loyalty to the leaders of groups, and through them to the groups themselves.

While the same principles apply in the family (where, of course, they are first learned), in the class room, in the local community, and in the regiment, their highest manifestation is in devotion to the national group expressed in loyalty to the divine Emperor as the symbol of national authority. Thus, intense, fanatical patriotism is the primary Japanese virtue, the supremely right and supremely good in the Japanese value system, and the epitome of Bushido.

A striking example of Bushido in action, typical of those associated with warfare, is that of the suicidal dash of three Japanese soldiers, who carried a large bomb into the barbed wire impeding the Japanese at Chapel in 1932. While they lost their lives, they made possible the advance of the army through the thirty foot gap opened in the wire. These "Human Bombs" were publicized and honored as manifesting the highest type of patriotism -- voluntary sacrifice of their lives for the good of the nation. Their deed has been imitated in army training, and utilized as an inspiration to school children, who are taken in groups to salute the statue erected in their honor. This heroic act reflects both Bushido and Yamato Damashii.

Another illustration of Bushido, which shows the persistence of Tokugawa values into the present, is the continuing veneration of the 47 Ronin (masterless samurai). These men were the faithful followers of a 17th century Daimyo who was treacherously maneuvered into dishonor and suicide. Their lord was trained in the ceremonial of the Shogun's court in preparation for an audience with the Shogun by a powerful man who deliberately mis-trained him, so that he made serious and insulting

c. Kodo. The "way of the Emperor" is the path to world domination, the Japanese version of the "white man's burden", which derives quite logically from Japanese belief in Yamato racial superiority and in the Emperor's divinity. A sentence ascribed to Jimmu, the first human emperor of Japan, which is known to every school child, puts it this way: "We shall build our capital all over the world, and make the whole world our domain." The War Office goes into greater detail:

"To bring together all the races of the world into one happy accord has been the ideal and the national aspiration of the Japanese since the very foundation of their Empire. We deem this the great mission of the Japanese race to the world. We also aspire to make a clean sweep of injustice and inequality from the earth and to bring about everlasting happiness among mankind."^{1/}

References to Hakko Ichiu, the "eight corners of the world", which are to be brought together under a single (Japanese) roof, are frequent in official elaborations of this idea.

While the term Kodo as applied to such ideas is new, it is not merely a concoction suddenly whipped out of the hat by the militarists. Rather, the ideas involved grow so naturally out of the Yamato Damashii-Shinto-Bushido complex that they must be regarded as the terminal point of an evolutionary sequence. Seen in these terms, Kodo, like Bushido, can be recognized as having validity for the Japanese because of its congruence with older beliefs, despite the fact that its grandiose conceptions seem so ridiculously pretentious (or did before Pearl Harbor).

Kodo, then, is sincerely and earnestly believed in by most Japanese high ranking military and government officials, and while not necessarily known formally to the masses there is nothing in it of which they would have cause to disapprove. Just as in the 19th century most Englishmen accepted it as their mission to civilize the world, so today the Japanese accept their obligation to spread the benefits of their (to them) superior civilization as

^{1/} This and the preceding quotation from Bradford Smith, "The Mind of Japan", Amerasia, March 1942, p. 8.

CONFIDENTIAL

111

widely as possible and by force of arms if necessary. This comparison is made neither to disparage the English, who for the most part abandoned their "white man's burden" rationalization long ago, nor to justify the Japanese in their aggression; it is made simply as the best means of expressing clearly one of the most important and least understood aspects of the Japanese attitudes which cluster around nationalism. The acceptance of Kodo is not merely passive, however, but is for many a militant force, supported as it is by the potent, emotionally weighted values of Yamato Damashii, State Shinto, and Bushido.^{1/}

3. The Ideal and the Actual in Japanese Patriotism. The attitudinal complex of Japanese nationalism is shared to some extent by virtually all Japanese, although in varying degrees from individual to individual and from class to class. Moreover, while the same leaps of faith are made by all but the very few real skeptics, the private rationalization of them by, say, a peasant and a member of the top army clique, must differ tremendously. Such differences are not made public, for the fiction that the Japanese are uniformly devoted to the Emperor and are all equally willing to make any sacrifice for Japan is rather generally respected. At the same time, there is a recognition that individuals may possess Yamato Damashii in greater or smaller degrees, the human bombs, the 47 Ronin, and the officer's wife described above having it to the Nth degree, with ordinary persons being less fortunate.

The problem of distinguishing the way the Japanese actually feel from the way they are supposed to feel is made more difficult by the existence of a superficial conformity, enforced by all sorts of sanctions, from the traditional requirement of proper behavior regardless of real feelings to the ruthless application of police terror. However, a few generalizations can be made.

^{1/} No mention has been made here of Kokutai, which has been discussed in earlier Psychology Division Memoranda. This is because Kokutai, literally the state structure or polity, involves most of the ideas described above, but integrates them around the formal concept of national polity in a rather esoteric way. While the word Kokutai is known to all Japanese, Kokutai as a specialized and elaborate formulation of Japanese nationalist ideology is known

a. The Top Cliques. Among the higher army and navy officers, the higher bureaucrats, and the industrialists and business men, there is little misunderstanding of the Emperor's role in government. Most of them are quite sincere in their lip-service to the divine Emperor, but they also recognize tacitly that his actual power is slight, since they are themselves engaged in the political manipulations which make Japan tick. The patriotic devotion of these men cannot always be whole-hearted, since they have their own interests as well as the country's to serve and since their sophistication is sufficient to prevent them from accepting uncritically the official ideology.

b. Middle Classes. White collar workers and technicians, although vocationally educated, have largely been prevented from studying political and sociological phenomena, and as a group probably accept at nearly face value the Emperor's supremacy in the state, as well as many of the ideological trimmings of Japanese nationalism. Some of them are skeptical about some of the articles of faith, but the effect of the war against the West, despite the material deprivations it entails for these people, has been to make them suppress their skepticism and leap on the nationalist band wagon in thought as well as in speech.

The upper middle class is more skeptical than the lower, but it, too, has been influenced by the war toward a less reluctant acceptance of nationalist dogma.

c. Workers. Although the urban proletariat has had to curtail its already low standard of living as a result of the militarists' policy, it probably contains few persons who are not enthusiastic in their profession of Japanese nationalism. The trade-unionism and communism which were fairly popular in the twenties have not only been forcibly suppressed, but have, in a sense, been subverted (from the Western viewpoint). This has occurred because of two special circumstances. First, Japanese trade-unionism, like so many other aspects of modern Japan which have been called by Western names, was never really like trade-unionism as we know it.

1/ (con't) only to scholars, and even they have no uniform understanding of its exact significance.

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11.

Relations between Japanese employers and workers have always had in them a good deal of the samurai tradition, workers being loyal to employers and employers feeling a genuine paternal responsibility to workers. Because these attitudes were deeply implanted, the alterations suffered by trade-unionism when it was imported into Japan was so great as to destroy its essence. Second, the group of extreme militarists now in control, while they abhor communism, particularly because of its relationship with the old enemy, Russia, are also decidedly anti-capitalist themselves, so that their program has had a definite appeal to the anti-capitalist elements in the country. The address made by one of the February 1936 rebel officers to a street crowd demonstrates this point:

"Why should we fight in Manchuria to protect the interests of the capitalists, the Mitsuis, the Kawasakis, the Morimuras and others? Manchuria was all right in the beginning, but now it is the hunting ground of the capitalists who are exploiting it for their own profit. We are for loyalty to the Emperor and elimination of the evil statesmen who stand between the people and the Emperor."^{1/}

Moreover, many of the urban workers, especially in the newer war industries, were formerly marginal agriculturalists, to whom a regular money income, however small, seems a real blessing after their losing struggle to make a living on the soil.

d. Farmers. The farmers must be thought of as sincere in their attitudes of patriotism, but as a group they are overtly less enthusiastic than many other sections of the population. As is often true of agriculturalists, they are engrossed in the realities of making a living from the soil and inclined to remain rather unimpressed by exciting doctrines from the city which do not touch their economic life immediately. At the same time, they have been through the primary schools and have thus acquired at least a dose of Japanese nationalism. Occasionally they may show some regret at the

^{1/} Wilfred Fleisher, Volcanic Isle, New York, 1941, p. 96.

departure of a conscripted son or some relief at a son's rejection by the army, but the reason is the economic suffering which results from the withdrawal of an able-bodied man from the farm rather than any lack of basic patriotism.

e. Army Rank and File. The rank and file of the army, drawn largely from peasant homes, or from the lower classes in the cities, is wholeheartedly enthusiastic. Not that the boys want to get killed or wounded -- until experienced, their reactions seem to be much like the green troops of any other country -- but they do want, more than anything else, to act the part of a soldier with honor. This means that if suicidal courage is required, they will display it, and that they make no reservation in so doing. The sprinkling of better educated men in the army is likely to strengthen rather than to weaken its devotion to duty. A great many of them are petty officials -- school teachers, minor bureaucrats, and the like -- who are often professional patrioteers whose very livelihood has depended on their being highly nationalistic. For others with better education, who are certainly not zealots, experience under fire is apparently enough to submerge other attitudes and bring strong nationalist feelings to the surface. This is clearly shown in the reflections of a former writer on his experiences as a squad leader in the Chinese war:

"Danger and hardship have bound us together in an iron-strong relationship on the field. We trust each other implicitly and we have merged our individual interests in the common whole. It seemed to me as I thought of it, that we had found simplicity and humility to be closely akin to nobleness. We had been welded solidly, in the fighting, into a group sworn to fight, through everything, for the fatherland. It gives us strength and makes us able to die in the field, almost unconsciously saluting the Emperor with our last breath. The hardships that had seemed so great at the time, almost unbearable, were now quickly forgotten. Indeed, they now appeared, in my mind's eye, to be bathed with a pure and radiant light.

See above 1.3.3. - 1.3.4. - 1.3.5. - 1.3.6. - 1.3.7. - 1.3.8. - 1.3.9. - 1.3.10. - 1.3.11. - 1.3.12. - 1.3.13. - 1.3.14. - 1.3.15. - 1.3.16. - 1.3.17. - 1.3.18. - 1.3.19. - 1.3.20. - 1.3.21. - 1.3.22. - 1.3.23. - 1.3.24. - 1.3.25. - 1.3.26. - 1.3.27. - 1.3.28. - 1.3.29. - 1.3.30. - 1.3.31. - 1.3.32. - 1.3.33. - 1.3.34. - 1.3.35. - 1.3.36. - 1.3.37. - 1.3.38. - 1.3.39. - 1.3.40. - 1.3.41. - 1.3.42. - 1.3.43. - 1.3.44. - 1.3.45. - 1.3.46. - 1.3.47. - 1.3.48. - 1.3.49. - 1.3.50. - 1.3.51. - 1.3.52. - 1.3.53. - 1.3.54. - 1.3.55. - 1.3.56. - 1.3.57. - 1.3.58. - 1.3.59. - 1.3.60. - 1.3.61. - 1.3.62. - 1.3.63. - 1.3.64. - 1.3.65. - 1.3.66. - 1.3.67. - 1.3.68. - 1.3.69. - 1.3.70. - 1.3.71. - 1.3.72. - 1.3.73. - 1.3.74. - 1.3.75. - 1.3.76. - 1.3.77. - 1.3.78. - 1.3.79. - 1.3.80. - 1.3.81. - 1.3.82. - 1.3.83. - 1.3.84. - 1.3.85. - 1.3.86. - 1.3.87. - 1.3.88. - 1.3.89. - 1.3.90. - 1.3.91. - 1.3.92. - 1.3.93. - 1.3.94. - 1.3.95. - 1.3.96. - 1.3.97. - 1.3.98. - 1.3.99. - 1.3.100. - 1.3.101. - 1.3.102. - 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"...this does not mean the end of the war. There are endless muddy roads and ghastly battles still ahead of us. Believing in our spiritual strength, I will go ahead as bravely as possible."^{1/}

f. Sincerity and Skepticism. It must be concluded that most Japanese are quite sincere in their attitudes of reverence for the Emperor and of admiration for themselves and their country. This is particularly true since the beginning of the war with the West, which has greatly heightened Japanese nationalist enthusiasm among all classes.

However, there have been dissenters from the ideology in the past, and the super-patriots, while they have had a very favorable set of attitudes to manipulate in their effort to generate 100 per cent Japanism, have also had to encounter widespread skepticism. All Japanese value formal correctness highly and are trained from birth to conform externally regardless of inner feelings. To them, frank self-expression, which we tend to praise, would be regarded as egoistic rudeness. It is true, however, that many Japanese of all classes have a sort of tongue-in-cheek attitude toward many of the forms which they observe punctiliously. The typical Japanese reaction to differences between appearances and realities is to accept and use the discrepancies without attempting to debunk them. It is therefore necessary to avoid the too easy assumption that attitudes in Japan are as unified and as sweepingly nationalistic as the public behavior of many Japanese seems to indicate.

These generalizations do not mean that the Japanese are insincere in their basic patriotism; but they do mean that real Japanese attitudes are decidedly more moderate and varied than the extreme expressions of jingoism which are now superficially accepted by virtually all Japanese.^{2/}

^{1/} Hino, Ashihei, Wheat and Soldiers, New York, 1939, pp. 149-150.

^{2/} See above I.G.3. Japanese Agnosticism for a discussion of religious skepticism.

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C. Attitudes toward Foreign Countries and Peoples

Japanese attitudes toward foreigners and towards foreign countries have already been touched upon in section A above. The strong anti-foreign feeling of most Japanese, while sometimes submerged, has been characteristic of the people as a whole for centuries. This feeling is closely linked with the Japanese conviction that they are racially and culturally superior to all other peoples, an attitude that gains reinforcement in periods of reaction against Western influences.

Recognizing that all foreigners are regarded by the Japanese as inferior, it is still possible to distinguish levels of inferiority. At the bottom of the hierarchy are found the native peoples of the Pacific Islands and of Asia, the Ainu, the Formosan aboriginals, the Filipinos, and Malaysians. At a level above these native peoples in Japanese opinion are the Koreans and the Chinese, who are regarded as being definitely superior to the preliterate tribesmen, but who are felt to have some traits in common with them. On the third level are found the Russians, who, as white men, are thought of as superior to any non-Japanese Asiatic, but who are not placed in quite the same category as other Westerners. Above them, but somewhat below the Japanese themselves, are other Westerners -- Americans, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans.

1. Native Peoples. The prevailing attitude of the Japanese toward Asiatic and Pacific natives is that they are simple, childlike people who require careful supervision to prevent their injuring either themselves or others. A sort of paternal benevolence is combined with an exploitative attitude, making Japanese colonial administrators anxious to provide certain rudimentary benefits of civilization such as schooling, some medical care, and in general enough instruction in civilized ways to produce useful peaceful populations; but, at the same time, willing to suppress any overt revolt with the utmost violence and to see the native peoples ruthlessly exploited for their labor power.

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The example of Japanese treatment of the aboriginals in Formosa typifies this attitude. On this island nearly half the area is still occupied principally by preliterate tribesmen, many of whom were formerly headhunters. The Japanese have enclosed them behind a so-called "guard line" -- a stockaded fortified zone around a vast inland area. Through the years they have narrowed the zone and have thrust back those natives who have been unwilling to submit to life in the "civilized" portions of the island. Occasional violence by tribesmen has met with full-scale military punitive expeditions resulting in the massacre of hundreds of the natives. At the same time, several thousand Japanese policemen assigned to the aboriginal areas have been expected to function as doctors, teachers, and councilors to the natives, as well as to keep order among them. Thousands of the aboriginals have been moved from the mountains to the low lands and set up as farmers, and other thousands have been "tamed" (the Japanese used this word in their English-language discussions), so that they have abandoned their own way of life and become workers useful in various Japanese enterprises.

2. Koreans. Koreans occupy a rather special position in Japanese thinking by virtue of the fact that the nearly half million of them who live in Japan proper constitute the only large minority there of common foreign origin. In general, Koreans probably occupy a position in Japanese thinking somewhere between the native peoples and the Chinese. In addition, however, the ordinary Japanese both fears and distrusts Koreans in Japan as foreigners who have good cause to dislike Japan. A striking demonstration of this tension in regard to Koreans occurred during the 1923 earthquake, when many Koreans were massacred on the basis of rumors about a Korean uprising against the Japanese.

3. The Chinese and China. The Japanese attitude toward the Chinese is ambivalent: there is considerable respect for Chinese culture, but it underlies a rather general disdain for the Chinese as a people. Japanese scholars and most fairly well educated Japanese recognize the tremendous cultural debt owed to China and accord the Chinese at least a grudging respect for their achievements in art, literature, and philosophy.

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192

Along with contempt for the Chinese, however, the Japanese leaders feel somewhat afraid of China's potentialities. They recognize that if China, with her tremendous population and considerable resources, were to achieve a unified national organization and to succeed in modernizing her industries she would be so powerful a nation that Japanese ambitions in east Asia could never be attained.

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The Japanese population as a whole have not given the Chinese war enthusiastic support. They have been loyal and have done what the government has demanded of them, but without accepting the war as the kind of Japanese crusade that it is represented to be in official propaganda. Perhaps the failure of the military to achieve the quick victory they anticipated, coupled with the decline in the common man's living standards during the middle 30's and during the course of the war, are responsible for this.

Chinese living elsewhere than in China Proper occupy a rather special position in the Japanese view. The Formosan Chinese are officially called "Taiwanese," the Manchurian Chinese, "Manchukuoans," apparently in an attempt to distinguish them from the inhabitants of China Proper. Government officials and probably also the Japanese man-in-the-street tend to regard these emigrants from China Proper as somewhat inferior to the Chinese in the homeland -- perhaps because the admiration for Chinese culture is not carried over to them.^{1/}

4. The U.S.S.R. and the Russians. Three conditions are primarily responsible for prevailing Japanese attitudes toward Russia and the Russians. The first of these is the fact that Japan, in defeating Russia in 1905, achieved her first victory over a Western power; the second is the old Imperial rivalry of the two countries in northeast Asia; and the third is Japanese fear and dislike of Soviet political organization.

Because Japan succeeded rather easily in her war against Russia in 1905, Japanese for many years despised the military prowess of the Russians and largely for this reason have regarded the Russians as somewhat inferior to other Westerners. The performance of Russia in the first World War and the complete collapse of the old Imperial organization

^{1/} The picture is not altogether clear, however. Official policy is to "Japanize" the Formosan Chinese while barring their way to the better professional or administrative jobs. This may point to an ultimate assimilation which would rank the Taiwanese close to the Yamato "race" itself and well above the Chinese in China.

served to strengthen these Japanese views, as was shown by the Japanese attempt to extend her power in the maritime provinces by military force following that war. This attitude still prevails among many Japanese, although Japanese leaders learned in the Changkufeng and Nomonhan affairs that Russia was no longer weak in a military sense. Today, because of Soviet losses in the war with Germany, there is apparently a resurgence of the old view, and many Japanese believe that Russia is militarily weak in the Far East. At the same time, the Soviet performance against Germany is recognized as a notable military achievement.

The imperial rivalry between the two countries has made the Japanese extremely suspicious of Russian intentions for decades. In recent years, these suspicions have manifested themselves in exceedingly strict surveillance of all Russians entering Japan and have played themselves out in intricate diplomatic maneuverings concerning such matters as the Chinese Eastern Railroad, the boundaries of Manchukuo, oil concessions in Sakhalin, and fishing concessions in Russian waters.

A final reason for enmity and distrust in Japanese attitudes toward Russia is the revolutionary Soviet government. Japanese officials greatly fear the possibility that Communism may gain strength in Japan, and as a consequence, they have done their utmost to inculcate hate of Communism in their population. Ordinary Japanese, because of traditional enmity between the two countries and because the victory of 1905 makes them feel superior to the Russians, have been receptive to these ideas. While the Communist movement gained some strength in Japan in the 1920's, it has probably been completely eliminated today.

No mere neutrality pact like the present one between Japan and the U.S.S.R. can destroy -- or even dull -- Japanese fear and suspicion of Russia. At the same time, the complicated, if uneasy interdependence of the two countries is such as to make the Japanese leaders reluctant to sacrifice their present oil concessions in Sakhalin and their fishing concessions

in Russian waters by provoking the Soviet Union too far, unless they feel confident that even greater advantages would quickly accrue following an attack. At the present time the tendency of the militarists to regard the Soviet maritime provinces as a revolver leveled at the heart of Japan persists, but Russian involvement in war with Germany reduces greatly the fear that the revolver may be loaded or the Soviet trigger finger sensitive.

5. Other Western Nations

a. United States. Toward the United States the Japanese have had a variety of attitudes, and their feelings toward us are perhaps more complicated than toward any other nation because of the rather frequent contacts between Americans and Japanese. Japanese attitudes have ranged from extreme admiration to profound dislike for the United States and her people. The admiration arises from America's leadership in bringing Western techniques to Japan and from America's greater willingness to recognize the Japanese as worthy people than other Western nations have displayed. The dislike, rooted in a general xenophobia, has risen from American arrogance, racial discrimination, and official condemnation of Japanese national expansionism.

The position of America as a chief rival of Japan for Pacific power is an important factor influencing the opinions of Japanese nationalists. As long as Russia could be ignored and England was involved in a European war, the United States stood as the principal obstacle to Japanese ambitions. This rivalry has been much more consciously felt by the Japanese -- who wished to alter the Pacific status quo in their favor -- than it has been in this country.

In general, the Japanese today tend to regard Americans as decadent, soft, and incapable of translating their enormous resources into effective military action. Japanese victories in the South Pacific have effectively reinforced the domestic anti-democratic propaganda line. The behavior of American tourists in Japan, with their love of luxury and ready spending of enormous sums of money, has helped in the spreading of this conviction.

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Perhaps the greatest single set of influences which have produced dislike of Americans are those associated with our own assertions of superiority. While these need not be detailed, they have included episodes like the 1924 Exclusion Act, which the Japanese have resented very intensely.

On the other hand, there are a great many Japanese who until very recently were well disposed toward Americans. American aid in the industrialization of the country, the generous response of this country in sending aid to the victims of the 1923 Tokyo earthquake, and the fact that many Americans in Japan acted less arrogantly than did other Europeans have contributed to this friendship. In addition, many Japanese have relatives in this country from whom they have received favorable reports on conditions here, as well as complaints about discriminatory treatment. American missionaries, although their effort to replace the supreme Japanese gods with an alien deity has been disliked, have contributed much in the way

CONFIDENTIAL

123

of educational and welfare activities which has been appreciated.

Evidence that America has many friends in Japan has not been lacking even in the crisis situations when the government has been whipping up anti-American sentiment. For example, at the time of the bombing of the Panay, the American Embassy received many expressions of sympathy as well as five million dollars in monetary contributions from private citizens acting on their own behalf to show their friendship for this country. One Japanese lady even went so far as to visit the American Embassy and to cut off her hair in the presence of the Ambassador's secretary, tie it with a ceremonial cord and present it to him, a traditional gesture expressing extreme regret and a desire to atone for a wrong. On other occasions, after Americans long resident in Japan started leaving the country because of the State Department's orders, they found numerous Japanese friends sorry to see them go and exceedingly sympathetic with them as individuals and as Americans.

b. Great Britain. The Japanese feeling toward the English is rather like that toward Americans, except that the dislike is more intense and the friendliness less marked. If America has been a major Pacific rival, England with her Asiatic Empire has been a principal obstacle to Japanese hegemony on the continent. The British who have visited Japan have tended to act as though they regarded the Japanese as just another Asiatic people, and this behavior has made them disliked as a group. To the militarists, the British base at Singapore, the Crown Colony of Hongkong, and British treaty rights in China have been particularly galling. Since the Battle of France, the Japanese respect for England as a mighty imperial power has rapidly declined.

c. France. France, following the World War, was the second power in East Asia (excepting Japan) to Japanese thinking, but if the fall of France destroyed some Japanese respect for the English, it completely convinced the Japanese that the French were no longer to be considered as of any significance in Asiatic politics.

192

Direct contacts of Frenchmen and Japanese have been more limited than Japanese contacts with either Americans or Englishmen, and Japanese attitudes toward the French have consequently not been built up on the basis of so broad an experience. There have been, however, a number of highly sympathetic contacts (e.g., Pierre Loti's enthusiasm for Japan), and certain general similarities between the two countries (love of art, marriage by go-between, administrative centralization, a sharp division between peasantry and townsfolk) are appreciated by many of the better educated Japanese. Japan's modern legal system was founded on the French model. For most Japanese, a Frenchman probably exists as a stereotype -- a member of a once powerful nation now become impotent, who nevertheless is somewhat akin in his way of thinking to cultured Japanese.

d. Germany. Japanese attitudes toward Germany today are derived principally from the tremendous military successes the Nazis have achieved. It is true that Germany provided a model for the Japanese constitution and that the Japanese army was originally built along the lines of the 19th century Russian army; but after Germany's military defeat in the World War relatively fewer Germans visited Japan than citizens of other Western nations, and German prestige was at a low ebb. Consequently, recent events assume a principal importance. With the signing of the anti-Comintern pact in 1936 and its later extension to a military alliance with Germany (and Italy) in 1940, Japanese leaders recognized not only the coincidence of Japanese and German interests in upsetting the status quo in Europe and Asia, but also the growing military might of the Germans.

After the occupation of Manchuria, trade with Germany increased, and in other ways official relationships between the two countries became more cordial. Unofficially, this meant that many German nationals moved into Japan, especially during the past few years.

The ordinary Japanese is not particularly fond of Germans because he knows little about them; the middle class Japanese with business or political ambition is perhaps somewhat inclined to resent

1. The Japanese attitude toward the Frenchman is based on the fact that the Frenchman is a member of a once powerful nation now become impotent, who nevertheless is somewhat akin in his way of thinking to cultured Japanese.

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on the grounds that they are, after all, Westerners and therefore inferior, the increase in recognition accorded to Germans in Japan; the government is apparently definitely suspicious of Germans in Japan and although forced by present political circumstances to allow them considerable freedom, keeps close watch on their activities.

It is essential in considering Japanese attitudes toward Germany and the Germans to recognize that many similarities between events in the two countries during recent years exist not because Japan copied Germany, but rather because two nations with similar problems found similar solutions. As has been pointed out earlier, Japanese government centralization has developed out of native Japanese traditions and was not imported from Nazi Germany. On the other hand, when close imitation has been appropriate to the Japanese situation, German ideas have been utilized. A conspicuous illustration is the new block organization of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, already described (see above, section II.C.1.b.). This one similarity between the IRAA and the Nazi party definitely does not mean that the IRAA as a whole is a slavish replica of the Nazi party.

A final consideration which must be present in the minds of Japanese leaders is that if both Japan and Germany win their wars, the sequel is likely to be an even greater war in which the two great Fascist Empires struggle for world supremacy. It would be a mistake, therefore, to assume that attitudinally the Japanese are as close to the Germans as their formal declarations make them appear to be.

6. Conclusion. In conclusion, it is important to recall that xenophobia is a fundamental Japanese attitude directed toward all other nations and peoples, and that it is the corollary of an unshakable faith in Japanese superiority. These attitudes merge in a sincere belief in Japan's national mission to extend her rule for the benefit of the ruled.

APPENDIX A

Festival and Historic Dates

The following list of significant dates is intended to include the more important of them and to characterize them briefly. The list is of importance for the general planning of propaganda or psychological warfare campaigns against Japan, but is not exhaustive.

National Holidays are marked with an asterisk (they are distinguished by crossed red flags on all Japanese calendars). Dates given are according to the Gregorian calendar, but it should be born in mind that the country people sometimes celebrate the older folk festivals by a lunar calendar. Months are named below, but Japanese names (usually flower names) are not given because the months are commonly referred to in Japan by number -- as first month, second month, etc.

* Jan. 1 & 3--Shogatsu (New Year's). New Year's is the most important holiday of the year. In rural areas and even in cities festivities and visits between relatives and friends, accompanied by banquets, may last for days. There are official Shinto Shrine services on January 1 (Shihohai) and January 3 (Genshisai). Debts for the old year are supposed to be cleared up, and there have been cases of men committing suicide because they could not meet their obligations by midnight of December 31. During New Year's week many people have a priest in to purify the house for the coming year. There is a whole series of "firsts" ceremoniously performed, two important ones being the first bath of the new year and the first meal. Families in rural areas celebrate New Year's by the old lunar calendar, which sometimes comes in February by "new calendar." (However, the official shrine ceremonies are by New Calendar everywhere).

July 1 - 1941
Oss
Sagami
Canton
Hankow
Kobe
Yokohama

102

CONFIDENTIAL

127

Jan. 15--Koshogatsuy (Small New Year's). This is the end of the New Year's season. Various ceremonies having to do with good crops for the coming year are practiced in rural areas at this time.

* Feb. 11--Kigenetsuy. Foundation day, in honor of the Accession of Jimmu Tenno to the throne in 660 B.C. Jimmu Tenno is regarded as the first human emperor, so February 11 celebrates the historic founding of the Japanese nation. (Most western historians put Jimmu Tenno's accession date at about 1 A.D.)

Feb. 22--The anniversary of the patriotic act of the Three Human Bombs. (See above, section III.B.2.b., Bushido, for the story.)

Feb. 26--Anniversary of the extensive assassinations by army men of government officials in 1936.

Mar. 3--Hina Matsuri (Girl Day or Doll Festival). This is one of a series of setsu which occur in odd numbered months and are celebrated in urban areas by new calendar and in rural areas by lunar calendar. It is a family festival in honor of girl children. (The festival is also called the Momo Soku or peach festival, the peach being a Japanese symbol for female.)

Mar. 6--Empress's birthday. Observed in girls schools and various women's associations. (If the present Empress dies this holiday will of course be changed to the birthday of her successor.)

* Mar. 21--Shunki-Korai-sai. (Spring Equinox Festival). This date corresponds to a Buddhist Equinox festival called Higan. The Buddhist Temple ceremonies mean more to the people and are more generally attended than are those of the Shinto shrines. There is a special memorial ceremony at Court for the Imperial Ancestors.

July 1945: Final Review: OSS Supporting Committee - March 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

128

* Apr. 3--Jimmu Tenno sai. Death day of Jimmu Tenno. Not a very important day.

Apr. 8--Buddha's birthday. A popular festival marked by ceremonies at Buddhist Temples, the commonest being one in which an herbal liquid called sweet tea is poured over a small figure of Buddha by visitors to the temple, who then take home some of the liquid as a cure for aches and pains.

* Apr. 29--Tencho-setsu. (Emperor's birthday). (If the present Emperor dies, this holiday will of course be changed to the birthday of his successor.)

(Usually the end of april). Cherry Blossom Season. The time at which the cherry trees blossom is the occasion of important sentimental and social festivities throughout Japan. The trees are visited and admired by multitudes, poems are written about them. The blossoms, which last so short a time, symbolize the transiency of life, and are also one of the recognized symbols of Japan.

May 5--Boy Day or Tengo no Sekku. Another of the Sekku, this one being in honor of boys. There are family banquets, and paper carp are flown by houses in which sons have been born during the past year. The carp is a symbol of the Japanese male because it swims upstream against handicaps.

July 7--Tanabata, another of the Sekku. This one is in honor of the stars, especially Veda and Altair, which are symbolized in a romantic story of two lovers who meet on this day.

July 13-15--O Bon. Festival of the Dead. An important popular festival in honor of the spirits of the dead, who are believed to return to earth at this time. Special dances (Bon odori) are performed in many towns and villages at this time.

Italy: 1st 61 Records: OSS Supplying Japanese Plans: 1945

182

In many rural areas Bon season is next in importance to New Year's. In 1942 there was a special national Bon ceremony for the spirits of soldiers who died overseas.

129

Sept. 4--Anniversary of the great earthquake of 1923.

Sept. 15--The Moon Festival in honor of the Harvest Moon. Mostly observed by lunar calendar in rural areas.

* Sept. 23--Shunki Kurei Sai. (Autumn Equinox Festival). As with the Spring Equinox, a Buddhist fall Higan is more important popularly than the Shinto observance. There are special services at the various local Buddhist temples, graveyards are visited and cleaned, and fresh flowers put by gravestones for the spirits of the ancestors. As at the Spring Equinox there is an important court memorial ceremony.

* Oct. 17--Kanname Sai. Harvest Thanksgiving to the Deities of Ise. Except at Ise this holiday is less important than the series of local fall festivals which occur on various dates in October and November in honor of the local gods of Shinto shrines throughout Japan.

* Nov. 3--Meiji Setsu. (Birthday of the Emperor Meiji). This is an important national holiday because the Emperor Meiji reigned during the 44 year period from 1868 to 1912, a period which began with the overthrow of the old feudal regime and during which great changes occurred in Japan. Under Meiji Japan became a modern world power. Meiji's rescript on education is read in the schools at a special ceremony on this day.^{1/}

^{1/} For text of rescript see section II.A.4., Aims in Education.

^{1/} For the story of the 47 Ronin see Lord Hidetada's Tale of Old Japan. A summary is given in Chapter 13, Japan's Story under the heading "Forty-seven". See also above, section II.A.2.B., Education for a sketch of the story.

* Nov. 23--Niname Sai. (Harvest festival of the Imperial House.) At court there is a ceremonial tasting of new rice by the Emperor and a thanking on behalf of the nation for the harvest both at Court and at Ise Shrine. Not a very important day for the people at large.

Dec. 8--Taisho Kotai Bi. (Pearl Harbor Day). The Japanese military are making a lot of this date, observing it the 8th of each month. Doubtless on December 8, 1942, there will be a big celebration if Japan is still doing well in the war.

Dec. 14--Anniversary of the revenge raid on Lord Kira's residence by the 47 Ronin.^{1/} There is a memorial service to their souls held on this day at Sengakuji Temple in Tokyo.

* Dec. 25--Taisho Tenno sai. Death day of the Emperor Taisho. (Not a very important day.)

^{1/} For the story of the 47 Ronin see Lord Ridesdales Tales of Old Japan. A summary is given in Chamberlain's Things Japanese under the heading: "Forty-Seven Ronins." See also above, section III.B.2.b., Bushido, for a brief sketch of the story.

July: From Lord Ridesdales: OSS Summary Committee Memo: 1942-1943

CONFIDENTIAL

131

APPENDIX B

JAPANESE NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES

Newspapers

The following list attempts to include all Japanese newspapers with circulations over 80,000. The basic source is the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce list, "Advertising Media in Japan and Chosen" as revised in 1939. A supplementary source has been the Political Handbook of the World, 1941 edition. Most of the material under "comments" is from this source. Japanese broadcasts have told of a number of mergers of newspapers, which have been noted below. The Department of Commerce list is much more extensive, mentioning the small newspapers as well as the large ones. In this list, the regional editions of the large Tokyo and Osaka newspapers are listed separately, thus giving them circulation figures smaller than those indicated in the text.

July - Found Records: OSS Supporting Conference Planning Group - 1945-1946

192

CONFIDENTIAL

133

Italy: Historical Records: OSS Supp. Com. Planning Sec. - 1000000

City	Name of Paper	Issued (Morning, Evening)	Circulation	Average No. of Pages	Comments
		M & E	250,000	10 & 4	Yomiuri were August Hochi in to merged in radio accounts Japan class Japan class liberal, live, appreciation Chau attention af- much foreign af- to foreign large in fair, large in circulatory circles milder circulation (older circulation give around at around 200,000).
		M & E	150,000	14	Miyako and Kokumin were merged in August according to Japanese radio broadcasts.
		M & E	30,000	8 & 4	
		M & E	150,000	6 & 4	

CONFIDENTIAL

134

Magazines

The following list of magazines includes those with circulations over 50,000 per issue as taken from the Bureau of Domestic and Foreign Commerce list, "Advertising Media in Japan and Chosen." As noted in the text above, there has been in recent years a restriction upon the number and size of Japanese publications. The material included were accurate as of 1939.

Name of Publication	Issued	Circulation	Average No. of Pages	Audience Appeal
OSAKA				
The Asahigraph	W	200,000	24	All classes
The Asahi Sports	BIM	120,000	32	All classes
Asahi Weekly	W	300,000	48	All classes
Asahi Camera	M	50,000	180	All classes
Screen & Stage	M	100,000	45	Plays and movie all classes, in English and Japanese
Stage & Screen	M	50,000	70	Plays & movies middle class
TOKYO				
Bungei Shinju	M	130,000	420	Literary class
Chuo Koron	M	120,000	550	Intellectual class
Eiga-to-Engai (The Stage and Screen)	M	60,000	100	Stage & Screen fans
Fujin Club	M	1,000,000	520	Women in general
Fujin Koron	M	300,000	520	Upper class women
Fujin-no-Tomo	M	300,000	232	Women in general
Fujokai	M	300,000	420	Middle class women
Gendai	M	300,000	400	Intellectual class
Jitsugyo-no-Nihon	M	100,000	200	Younger generation
King	M	1,200,000	600	All classes
Kodan Club	M	700,000	500	Lower class
Shonen Club	M	700,000	400	Young men & boys
Shufunotomo	M	500,000	600	Women in general
Shotenkai	M	50,000	150	Business firms, a trade journal

Italy: Historical Records: OSS Supporting Committee Planning - 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

135

APPENDIX C

Japanese Radio Stations

Domestic stations. There are 47 medium-wave transmitters in Japan proper. The 7 of these which initiate programs are as follows:

<u>Station</u>	<u>Call letters</u>	<u>Kilocycles</u>	<u>Kilowatts</u>
Tokyo	JOAK	590 870	150 150
Osaka	JOBK	690 940	100? 100?
Nagoya	JOCK	730 990	10 10
Kumamoto (Kyushu)	JOGK	790	10
Hiroshima	JOFK	830	10
Sendai	JOHK	770	10
Sapporo (Hokkaido)	JOIK	810	10

Summary of Japanese Short-Wave Broadcast Activities

In addition to the Tokyo station with its ten or more active transmitters, the Japanese send short-wave programs to the world from Bangkok, Hongkong, Hsingking, Manila, Peiping, Saigon, Shanghai, Shonan (Singapore), and Taiwan. The stations at Harbin (in Russian at least), Rangoon, and Batavia (in Javanese, Malay, and Japanese) are known to be operating, but their daily programs are not yet established by the FCC monitors. The following table summarizes Japanese shortwave activities by language and major beam. The source is the FCC Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, "Program Schedules of Foreign Broadcasters," as revised September 4, 1942. This list gives complete details on the call letters, frequencies, and times of broadcasts for the programs of the first group of stations mentioned above.

Tab: Historical Records: OSS Supporting Committee Planning Group - Working Files

CONFIDENTIAL

136

<u>Language</u>	<u>Hours Daily from Tokyo</u>	<u>Hours Daily from Other Japanese-Controlled Stations</u>	<u>Total Hours</u>
TO ASIA AND AUSTRALIA			
Japanese	14-1/2	3-1/2	18
English	3-1/2	6-1/2	10
Chinese	2/3	7-1/2	8-1/6
Cantonese	1	1/4	1-1/4
Fukien	1/2		1/2
Thai	1/2	3-1/2	4
French	1	1-5/6	2-5/6
Dutch	1/4	1-1/4	1-1/2
Spanish	1/4	1/4	1/2
Tagalog	1/4	1/2	3/4
Malay	2/3		2/3
Burmese	1/2	1/2	1
Annamese	1/2	1/2	1
Russian		(Extent of broadcasts unknown)	Total unknown
Javanese		" " "	"

TO INDIA AND MIDDLE EAST			
Hindustani	1/2	1/2	1
Urdu	3/4		3/4
Visayan		1/6	1/6
Panjovian		1/4	1/4
Arabic	1		1
Turkish	1/4		1/4
English	1/2	1-1/4	1-3/4
French	1/2		1/2
Japanese	1/2		1/2

TO EUROPE			
English	1-1/2	3/4 (also to Africa)	2-1/4
Japanese	1		1
French	1/2	1/2 (also to Madagascar)	1
German	3/4		3/4
Italian	3/4		3/4

TO AMERICA			
English	3-1/3	1-1/2 (also Hawaii)	4-5/6
Japanese	1		1
Chinese	1/3		1/3
Portuguese	1/2		1/2
Spanish	1		1